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ARTICLES
WHY FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND WHY THAT MATTERS
Kenneth S. Klein *
I. INTRODUCTION
It might seem at best quixotic, and at worst absurd, to assert
that Federal Rule of Evidence 403-an iconic evidentiary exclu-
sionary' rule providing that relevant evidence can be excluded if
it is too time-consuming or distracting-is unconstitutional.2 Yet,
if the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution-
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A., Rice Universi-
ty; J.D., University of Texas School of Law. The author thanks his spouse and colleague,
Professor Lisa Black, for her continuing invaluable assistance (and patience) as an editor.
Equally essential was the work of the author's research assistant, Katie Suchman. Kristi-
na Fretwell did the tough duty of surveying fifty state constitutions for me. The author
also appreciates the comments, suggestions, and edits of professional colleagues Professors
Deborah Merritt, Mario Conte, Larry Benner, Walt Heiser, and Daniel Yeager. The author
is grateful for the substantial improvement of this article resulting from the author's par-
ticipation in the Southern California Junior Law Faculty Workshop, as well as the support
of the library staff of California Western School of Law, and the research grant supporting
this article from California Western School of Law. This article is dedicated to my family.
My parents taught me to think. My siblings taught me to question. My wife taught me to
hear. My daughter taught me to see.
1. FRE 403 excludes evidence based on the content of the evidence and balancing the
evidence's relevance against the evidence's contribution to or impairment of the advance-
ment of accurate and efficient justice. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Other evidentiary exclusion-
ary rules, such as hearsay rules, focus on the source of the evidence. See e.g., FED. R. EVID.
801; FED. R. EVID. 802. Still others, such as privilege rules, derive from promotion of pub-
lic policies external to a trial. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. EVID. 502. When this ar-
ticle refers to evidentiary exclusionary rules, it is focused generally on relevancy rules, and
specifically on FRE 403.
2. In my own defense, however, I note that others have gone even further. See David
Crump, The Case for Selective Abolition of the Rules of Evidence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 585,
640-44 (2006).
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respectively preserving the right to a criminal jury and a civil ju-
ry-are to be taken seriously, that conclusion not only is plausi-
ble, but perhaps inescapable. More surprisingly and consequen-
tially, deep thinking about the constitutionality of FRE 403
exposes that there may be constitutional concerns with large
swaths of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The argument attacking the constitutionality of FRE 403 is
simple to state, at least in the first instance. FRE 403 permits the
exclusion of "relevant" evidence,3 which FRE 401 defines as evi-
dence making a fact "of consequence" "more or less probable., 4 If
constitutionally a jury is the exclusive fact finder on a particular
issue, and if a piece of evidence makes a fact of consequence to
that issue more or less likely, then it would seem there is no way
constitutionally to keep that evidence from the jury, at least not
on a justification of more efficient trials and, in the judge's view,
more accurate verdicts. The Supreme Court has held that neither
efficiency nor accuracy is a basis for constricting the right to a
trial by jury.'
Yet, that is the effect and goal of FRE 403: "The court may ex-
clude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."6 As
the Advisory Committee's Notes to FRE 403 concede, the rule al-
lows and intends the exclusion of "unquestioned" relevant evi-
dence.' There is an identical or nearly identical counterpart to
FRE 403 in the codes or case law of all fifty states.' This raises
3. FED. R. EVID. 403.
4. FED. R. EVID. 401.
5. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (stating that "our decision
cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs efficiency or fairness").
6. FED. R. EVID. 403.
7. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
8. See ALA. R. EVID. 403; ALASKA R. EVID. 403; ARIz. R. EVID. 403; ARK. R. EVID 403;
CAL. EVID. CODE 352; COLO. R. EVID. 403; CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-3; DEL. R. EVID. 403; FLA.
STAT. § 90.403 (Repl. Vol. 2012); HAW. R. EVID. 403; IDAHO R. EVID. 403; ILL. EVID. R. 403;
IND. R. Evim. 403; IOWA R. EvID. 5.403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum.
Supp. 2012); KY. R. EVID. 403; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 403; ME. R. EVID. 403; MD. R.
EVID. 5-403; MICH. R. EVID. 403; MINN. R. EvID. 403; MiSS. R. EvID. 403; MONT. R. EVID.
403; NEB. R. EviD. 403; NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035 (West 2013); N.H. R. EVID. 403; N.J. R.
EvID. 403; N.M. R. EviD. 11-403; N.C. R. EVID. 1403; N.D. R. EvID. 403; OHIO R. EVID. 403;
1078 [Vol. 47:1077
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the question: If the fact to be determined is "of consequence," and
if the evidence at issue "unquestionably" makes the fact "more or
less probable," and if the jury is the one constitutionally empow-
ered and required to decide the fact, then shouldn't it follow that
constitutionally the judge cannot exclude the evidence from the
jury?
In practice, such evidence is kept from juries all the time. Con-
sider the example of United States v. Crowley,9 a case typical of
evidence cases decided every day. Francis Crowley and Steven
Valjato-both students in the Kings Point Merchant Marine
Academy-were charged with sexual assault of fellow midship-
man Stephanie Vincent.° The defense was permitted to call mid-
shipman Shannon Pender to testify generally that Vincent had
made other "accusations" against fellow students that had been
"proven" false and that Pender believed Vincent was not a truth-
ful person." The defense wished to cross-examine their accuser,
Vincent, about Pender's testimony." During voir dire of Vincent-
in other words, under examination outside of the presence of the
jury-she denied lying when making each of these past accusa-
tions. " After hearing the voir dire, the trial judge prohibited the
defense from cross-examining Vincent in the presence of the jury
about what Pender had described as Vincent's past history of
false accusations. 14
The appellate court, while recognizing that "Vincent's credibil-
ity was obviously a critical issue at trial," affirmed the trial court
12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2403 (Repl. Vol. 2011); OR. R. EVID. 403; PA. R. EVID. 403; R.I. R.
EVID. 403; S.C. R. EVID. 403; S.D. R. EVID. 403; TENN. R. EVID. 403; TEX. R. EVID. 403;
UTAH. R. EVID. 403; VT. R. EviD. 403; VA. R. EVID. 2:403; WASH. R. EVID. 403; W.VA. R.
EVID. 403; Wis. R. § 904.03; Wyo. R. EVID. 403. Four states provide the same evidentiary
rule by case law rather than code. See Dep't of Transp. v. Mendel, 517 S.E.2d 365, 368 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1999); Ross v. State, 614 S.E.2d 31, 33 (Ga. 2005); Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 802
N.E.2d 521, 528 (Mass. 2003); Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 921 N.E.2d 968, 977-78 (Mass.
2010); Pittman v. Ripley Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 318 S.W.3d 289, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010);
People v. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d 728, 732 (N.Y. 1988); State v. Rosado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369,
374-75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
9. 318 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2003).
10. Id. at 404-06.
11. Id. at 416. Under FRE 608, the testimony could not go into specific instances of
conduct. Id. at 417.
12. Id. at416.
13. Id. at 416-17. An in camera review of the Academy's files showed the findings of
the investigation of the prior accusations were "equivocal." Id. at 418.
14. Id. at 416-17.
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ruling." On what the appellate court characterized as a "critical
issue"-the credibility of the accuser-questions to the accuser
about whether the accuser had falsely made the same sort of alle-
gations in the past were kept from the jury based on concerns
about whether the jury could be trusted to accurately weigh the
evidence:
The voir dire examination established that Vincent would deny mak-
ing false accusations or lying in connection with Academy investiga-
tions of other students. Since the defense would be precluded by Rule
608(b) from attempting to refute Vincent's testimony by offering ex-
trinsic evidence concerning the incidents in question, the only evi-
dence before the jury on the subject would have been Vincent's deni-
al of falsehood.
Allowing cross-examination before the jury would thus have pro-
duced little of probative value. Certainly, the trial court was well
within its discretion in not allowing any broader inquiry into the na-
ture of what Vincent had told the authorities and what the results of
their investigations (to the extent Vincent even knew of them) had
been. Such broad-ranging inquiry would at best have produced con-
fusing and distracting sideshows regarding the facts of controversies
completely unrelated to the charges against Crowley at trial, and was
properly precluded. 16
This result, on its face, would seem to repudiate the role of the ju-
ry. It simply denies the jury its constitutional role to decide for it-
self what weight to give Vincent's denial that she had made simi-
lar false allegations in the past.
Evidentiary exclusionary rules such as these unambiguously
are based on a distrust of juries. As the American Law Institute
("ALI"), in promulgating its first Model Code of Evidence, indeli-
cately reported concerning the "common wisdom" of the day, "The
low intellectual capacity of the jury is commonly put forward to
justify some, if not all, of our exclusionary rules. . . . [Jiurors are
treated as if they were low grade morons." 7
In other words, evidentiary exclusionary rules are not attempts
to control all trials, but rather are attempts to control jury tri-
als.' Even in the nineteenth century, judges largely ignored ex-
15. Id. at 416.
16. Id. at 417-18 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
17. Edmond M. Morgan, Foreward to MODEL CODE OF EVID., at 8-10 (1942). It should
be noted, however, that the ALI asserted that the ALI itself did not share this view. Id. at
10.
18. Accord Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S ..... 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2234-35 (2012)
[Vol. 47:10771080
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clusionary rules in bench trials.'9 Typical of judges' views of the
role of evidence rules in bench trials were the words of the Hon-
orable Augustus Hand, who in the ALI Proceedings considering
the final draft of the Model Code of Evidence said he had "taken
pride" that he had tried cases for thirteen years without knowing
the technicalities of the rules of evidence."0
One might argue that a rule premised on trusting judges more
than juries to weigh evidence makes for a better justice system,
but such a rule is at odds with the decision enshrined by the
Framers-juries, not judges, decide the facts in jury trials. The
Framers made this decision recognizing that jurors have both per-
ceived and actual deficiencies in their decision making.21 Con-
versely, while the role of the jury as the exclusive fact finder is
constitutionally enshrined,22 efficiency and accuracy as system
goals are not constitutionally enshrined. Thus, FRE 403-
explicitly premised on making trials more efficient and accu-
rate-is unconstitutional.
Now one might argue that this cannot be; for example, in an
assault that occurs on stage at a music concert, a trial court simp-
ly could not allow a defense attorney to call as a witness every
single member of the audience, could it? And that is correct if at
some point, after admitting sufficiently consistent and cumulative
evidence, a fact is no longer disputable and so further evidence is
no longer "of consequence." But one never reaches a FRE 403 ex-
clusionary balance unless one already has determined that the
fact still is of consequence and the proffered evidence does matter
(is "relevant") to that fact.23 The Constitution would deem it to be
("[I]njury trials, both Illinois and federal law generally bar an expert from disclosing [the
basis of the expert's opinion]. In bench trials, however, both the Illinois and the Federal
Rules place no restriction on the revelation of such information to the factfinder. When the
judge sits as the trier of fact, it is presumed that the judge will understand the limited
reason for the disclosure of the underlying inadmissible information and will not rely on
that information for any improper purpose.").
19. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAw 529 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969) (1898).
20. E.M. Morgan, Discussion of Code of Evidence Proposed Final Draft, 19 A.L.I.
PROc. 74, 225 (1942) (remarks of Augustus Hand).
21. See infra Section III.
22. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308, 313 (2004); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999).
23. The Supreme Court has held that procedures such as summary judgment or di-
rected verdict can take a case away from a jury if the fact is not of consequence and dis-
putable. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Galloway v.
United States, 319. U.S. 372, 388-96 (1943); Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S.
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the jury's province, not the judge's province, to decide what
weight to give that evidence.24 Or more to the point, if efficiency is
not a constitutional value, then there is no constitutional provi-
sion that a judge can invoke to exclude from the jury even judge-
perceived time-consuming and mind-numbing yet relevant evi-
dence, at least not simply on the basis that in the judge's opinion
it is time-consuming and mind-numbing, albeit relevant.25
There are profound implications to the conclusion that the de-
sirability of efficient or accurate trials cannot justify abrogating
constitutional rights. Large swaths of federal rules of procedure
and evidence are grounded in making trials more efficient or ac-
curate.26 If efficiency and accuracy are insufficient to overcome
the prerogative of the jury, then many rules are built on illusory
foundations. 2
In the end, this article argues for two initially startling propo-
sitions. The constitutional right to trial by jury largely prevents a
trial judge from regulating the presentation of evidence to ensure
a rationally efficient trial and accurate verdict. And no academic,
lawyer, or judge has evaluated the argument before now. To
make these arguments, Section II of this article will trace the
surprisingly recent lineage of evidentiary exclusionary rules and
the rationales advanced by them, all of which post-date the con-
stitutional enshrinement of jury trial rights, and none of which
takes that enshrinement into account. Section III of this article
will review the increasingly forgotten history of the Sixth and
Seventh Amendment guarantees of a right to trial by jury, with
particular focus on the recognition by the Framers that jurors
had, at best, flawed capabilities, yet still were preferred to judges
as decision makers at trial. In other words, the Framers chose ju-
315, 318, 322 (1902). It does bear noting, however, that at least one scholar questions the
constitutionality of these procedures as well. Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive
Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 761 (2009); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (2007).
24. As a practical matter, of course, this circumstance would never happen. An attor-
ney would never be so foolish as to risk angering a jury in this way. The risk would be too
high of a consequent price to be paid by his or her client.
25. But this does highlight another point: The clauses of FRE 403 do not necessarily
share a single constitutional fate. Cumulative evidence might still be constitutionally ex-
cludable (because, for example, the testimony of the 499th person is no longer of conse-
quence), while presumed "too emotional" or "confusing" evidence might not. The focus of
this article is on exclusion of evidence despite it meeting FRE 401's definition of relevance.
26. See infra Section VI.
27. This broader point will be developed more fully in my anticipated next article.
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ries over judges with their eyes open. Section IV of this article
then turns specifically to the jurisprudence recognizing the jury
not just as the trial fact finder, but as the exclusive fact finder.
Section V of this article then will evaluate the constitutionality of
FRE 403. Section VI of this article will address, in overview, the
question of why it matters.
II. THE SURPRISINGLY RECENT HISTORY IN WESTERN
JURISPRUDENCE OF EXCLUDING EVIDENCE FROM THE JURY
For the majority of western legal history, the structure of and
presumptions underlying trials were very different from today,
and as a consequence evidentiary exclusionary rules would have
been foreign to jurisprudential doctrine. But as trial practice
evolved, the "proper" sources of evidence became more crimped,
judges had fewer tools to directly mandate a particular jury ver-
dict, and exclusionary rules emerged as a means to control jurors.
Thus, evidence rules evolved from a presumption of no exclusion,
to exclusion of tangential evidence, to exclusion of unquestioned
relevant evidence. And while that journey traced a path of in-
creasing distrust of the competency and attention span of juries,28
it was never tempered by concerns that it encroached on constitu-
tional prerogatives or even included apparent cognizance that it
might.
A. Pre-Code Views of Excluding Evidence
The conceptual and jurisprudential history of FRE 403 entirely
post-dates the constitutional guarantees of a right to trial by jury.
When the ALI published the Model Code of Evidence in 1942,
the bound volume republished an article from the Iowa Law Re-
view by Dean Mason Ladd, a member of the ALI's Evidence
Committee.29 In that article, Dean Ladd summarized the journey
in the evolution of trial practice that had led to exclusionary
rules:
28. See generally Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 47 HAST. L.J. 1325
(1996).
29. Mason Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IOWA L. REV. 213 (1942), reprinted in
MODEL CODE EVIDENCE 329 (1942).
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The law of evidence is not ancient in origin .... From the twelfth
through the sixteenth centuries the inquisitorial system was the
most common method of trial and was the forerunner of trial by jury
as we know it today.
During this formative period there was no need for the law of evi-
dence.... Even as late as 1670, in Bushell's case, Chief Justice
Vaughn permitted the jury to rely upon their own knowledge to nul-
lify the evidence of witnesses given in court. It was not until the later
part of the eighteenth century that the practice of using independent
juries to decide upon facts gained through witnesses presented be-
fore them was firmly established .... The law of evidence as we
think of it today began to emerge with the advent of the adversary
system under which juries decided solely upon the knowledge of wit-
nesses.
The jury is frequently spoken of as the parent of the rules of evi-
dence. The nineteenth-century textwriters and judges regarded the
rules of evidence as being established to keep from the jury unrelia-
ble persons and misleading testimony. Thus arose the law of incom-
petency and the exclusionary rules.... By the beginning of the nine-
teenth century most of the rules were established .... [M] any new
exclusionary rules were created in this period when limitation and
restriction flourished at the expense of a great loss of evidence which
would materially assist in the determination of factual disputes....
The twentieth century may be looked upon as creating an open
door policy in the law of evidence.
A model code must presuppose a competent judge, intelligent triers-
of-fact, and a society in which honest people outnumber the degrad-
ed, the deceitful, and the false-swearing. It must also assume ability
on the part of lawyers through cross-examination and other legal
methods of testing the credibility of witnesses to be able in the ma-
jority of situations to expose the false and discover the true. °
As alluded to by Dean Ladd, in the early centuries of western
trial practice, there would be no reason for exclusionary rules of
any sort to keep evidence out of trials, as there was not even a re-
striction limiting verdicts to the evidence presented at trial." The
early English system was one of self-informing juries,32 and so, it
"hardly had any place for a law of evidence."33 Simply put, be-
30. Id. at 332-34, 339 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 333.
32. See generally JAMES OLDHAM, THE VARIED LIFE OF THE SELF-INFORMING JURY
(2005). Self-informing juries were ones expected to bring their external knowledge of facts
to bear in reaching a verdict, and often the jurors were chosen because they were well-
situated to do so. See id. at 4.
33. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170 (1996) (quoting 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I
1084 [Vol. 47:1077
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cause the jury did, and was expected to, both find and consider
evidence external to the trial, there was no purpose to restricting
the evidence presented at trial. At least as late as the mid-
sixteenth century, there are records of English trials where jurors
permissibly used their own outside knowledge in reaching ver-
dicts.1
4
What was happening in England matters for several reasons.
England was the root system of each court structure in the Colo-
nies."5 England was the most mature and populated source of
precedent and experience during the early years of the United
States.36 And late eighteenth century England is still today, by
United States Supreme Court holding, the benchmark for meas-
uring American jury trial rights in federal civil trials.37
It was roughly the middle of the eighteenth century in England
when "evidence presented at trial became the exclusive basis for
the jury's decision."8 In 1764, Lord Mansfield wrote, "A juror
should be as white paper and know neither plaintiff nor defend-
ant, but judge of the issue merely as an abstract proposition upon
the evidence produced before him."39 This is an important histori-
cal juncture, as it is precisely the juncture when the then-
Colonies were shaping the soon-to-be United States court sys-
tem.40
Nonetheless, English courts of the mid-eighteenth century had
no jurisprudential counterpart to today's FRE 403. In the eight-
660 (2d ed. 1898)).
34. THAYER, supra note 19, at 120-21.
35. Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L.
REV. 347, 361-62 (2003); see ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 58-63 (1940).
36. See generally POUND, supra note 35, at vi-ix.
37. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (quoting
Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656-57 (1935)) ("[W]e have under-
stood that '[t]he right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the
English common law when the Amendment was adopted.'); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of
How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1005, 1005-06 (1992).
38. Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 457
(2004).
39. Mylock v. Saladine, (1764) 96 Eng. Rep. 278 (KB.) 278. Although, as will be de-
tailed below in this article, in the soon-to-be-formed United States, shadows of the self-
informing jury continued through the vicinage jury.
40. For examples of how civil jury practice looks to historic practice in England, rather
than in the United States, as the reference point for determining the procedural and evi-
dentiary parameters of the jury right, see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1935)
and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898).
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eenth century, exclusionary rules focused on excluding classes of
witnesses, rather than excluding pieces of evidence.4' The transi-
tion to excluding "particles" of evidence was a nineteenth century
evolution.42
To the extent that eighteenth century English practice ad-
dressed particles of evidence at all, the concerns were akin to
hearsay, not jury competence. The focus of mid-eighteenth centu-
ry English evidence law was on the admissibility of writings; Pro-
fessor Gallanis undertook to read every reported English decision
from the year 1755, and found only one civil case excluding oral
evidence at all, and only six cases-civil or criminal-where there
was even a reported objection on the basis of hearsay." An early
evidence commentator described the possibility in eighteenth cen-
tury England of excluding evidence from the jury in instances
such as a dubiously truthful witness4 4 but argued against it be-
cause it was for the fact finder to weigh the credibility and weight
of all evidence.45
As this discussion suggests, the eighteenth century was trans-
formative for jury trials.46 In the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies, jurors could be fined or imprisoned for reaching a verdict
at odds with the one the judge determined to be correct.47 Eviden-
tiary exclusionary rules emerged as these methods of controlling
41. See John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1213
(2006).
42. See id. at 1213-14.
43. T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 509-15
(1999); see also Langbein, supra note 33, at 1186. Because hearsay, while a recognized ba-
sis for exclusion, was so infrequently invoked, it is difficult to know what the Framers
thought of it. The Framers did not mention hearsay. Because of Confrontation Clause
rights, however, hearsay requires a different analytical approach than other rules of ex-
clusion.
44. See GEOFFREY GILBERT & JAMES SEDGWICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1 (7th ed.
1805) ("[T]he first thing to be treated of, is the evidence that ought to be offered to the jury
...."); id. at 3 ("The first, therefore, and most signal rule, in relation to evidence, is this;
that a man must have the utmost evidence .... ."); id. at 106 ("[It is also easy for persons
who are prejudiced and prepossessed, to put false and unequal glosses for what they give
in evidence, and therefore the law removes them from testimony, to prevent their sliding
into perjury ....").
45. See id. at 126-29.
46. See generally John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs:
The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 201-03 (1988).
47. See THAYER, supra note 19, at 164-66.
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juries and verdicts disappeared. 4' This was the world in which the
United States courts were born.49
B. Exclusionary Rules from the American Revolution Through to
the Proposed Model Code of Evidence
It is a slightly slippery matter to pin down precisely when the
exclusionary concepts that became FRE 403 first emerged. It cer-
tainly, however, was well after the ratification of the Constitution
and the adoption of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.
Professor Andrew Dolan, writing in the immediate wake of the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, traced FRE 403 back
to the first half of the nineteenth century, arguing that Green-
leafs 1842 A Treatise on the Law of Evidence "was the first to in-
troduce the considerations which would ultimately find their way
into [FRE 4031, such as undue prejudice and a tendency to mis-
lead the jury."0 However, at that point Greenleaf's proposal was
to exclude "collateral" or irrelevant evidence rather than prejudi-
cial but relevant evidence." The authors of the Federal Rules of
Evidence cite Professor M.C. Slough, 52 who in turn states that the
iconic James Bradley Thayer was the first to explicitly develop
the thesis that relevant evidence could be excluded by other 403-
like principles of law. 3
48. See id. at 174-81.
49. At the time of the formation of the United States, evidence law and the province of
the jury looked different from the way these matters look today. For example, judges still
would occasionally seek outside knowledge to inform judicial decisions. See J.H. Beuscher,
The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1108-12 (1941). Juries, while
limited to consideration of trial evidence, still were expected to bring local knowledge to
decision making in evaluating that evidence. See Daniel D. Blinka, Trial By Jury On The
Eve of Revolution: The Virginia Experience, 71 UMKC L. REV. 529, 569-70 (2003). As an-
other example of how different jury trial practice looked, there were even occasional in-
stances of the United States Supreme Court empanelling juries. See, e.g., Camberling v.
McCall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 280, 28-81, 284-85 (1797); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1,
5 (1794); David J. Bederman, Admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 935, 957-58 (1997) (discussing Minutes of Cutting v. South Carolina, Feb. 8, 10, Aug.
8, 11, 1797 (U.S.), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 285-87, 291-94 (Maeva Marcus et al., eds., 1985)).
50. Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
220, 222 n.5 (1976).
51. See id.
52. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
53. See M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1956). Langbein
argues that the development of adversarial criminal procedure in the later eighteenth cen-
tury is the basis of modern exclusionary rules of evidence. Langbein, supra note 33, at
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Accepting the Rules Advisory Committee's self-described line-
age then, FRE 403 conceptually began, at least explicitly, in 1898.
In 1898, Thayer asserted, without citation, a position very similar
to that codified today in FRE 403: "[Evidence] must not unneces-
sarily complicate the case, or too much tend to confuse, mislead,
or tire the minds of that untrained tribunal, the jury, or to with-
draw their attention too much from the real issues of the case"
and that "in the application of such standards as these, the chief
appeal is made to sound judgment; to what our lawyers have
called, for six or seven centuries at least, the discretion of the
judge.""' Three caveats should be kept in mind when revisiting
the Thayerian position now over a century later. First, Thayer's
ideas recognized evidentiary exclusionary rules but largely saw
them as matters of substantive law, rather than matters of cer-
tain types of evidence being beyond the ken of the jurors.55 Sec-
ond, Thayer was concerned only with the means of excluding evi-
dence of tangential relevance, as contrasted with the reach of
FRE 403 today, which purports to permit exclusion of evidence of
"unquestioned relevance."" Third, Thayer never addressed or
even considered whether the Constitution permitted exclusion of
relevant evidence.
In summary, in English legal practice just before the American
Revolution-which was the legal system of the American Colo-
nies-essentially no evidence other than hearsay was ever ex-
cluded, and even hearsay rarely was excluded." By the late nine-
teenth century, an American trial judge could exclude evidence,
but not if the evidence had more than a "remote" relevance to the
issues.58 And "lallthough the 19th Century codifiers recognized
the discretion of the trial judge in rulings on evidence, they pro-
1172.
54. THAYER, supra note 19, at 516.
55. See Edmund M. Morgan, The Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 TEX. L. REV. 587,
589 (1951). These were exclusions for reasons such as the parol evidence rule.
56. Compare THAYER, supra note 19, at 516-18, with FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory
committee's note.
57. As late as 1827, Bentham argued that a fact finder should weigh even defective
evidence. See 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 536-42 (John S. Mill
ed., 1827).
58. 22A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5211 n.18 (2012) (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON
ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 458 (1873)).
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duced nothing like Rule 403. That rule finds its roots in Rule 303
of the Model Code of Evidence. . .""
C. Exclusionary Rules in the ALl's Proposed Model Code of
Evidence
The Model Code sought to codify a "clear, concise, and com-
plete" presentation of the "best of modern thought" on evidence
doctrine and practice.6" That thought apparently did include dis-
cussion on the relative competencies of judges and juries and the
necessity for efficient and accurate trials.6 That thought did not
include the possible intersection of evidence rules with the Sixth
and Seventh Amendment guarantees of a right to trial by jury.
The ALI promulgated the Model Code in 1942.2 Less than a
decade earlier, the Supreme Court, without considering constitu-
tional concerns, had explicitly defined the role of evidence rules
as seeking more accurate and efficient trials:
It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that our rules of
evidence are framed. They have their source very often in considera-
tions of administrative convenience, of practical expediency, and not
in rules of logic. When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset
the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out.6
3
In stating this, the Court made no mention of the constitutional
right to trial by jury.
In light of this verbiage from the Court, it should not be sur-
prising that the Model Code included a rule explicitly aimed at
excluding time-consuming or confusing evidence. Rule 303 of the
Model Code states, in pertinent part:
The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create substantial
59. Id. § 5211.
60. Ladd, supra note 29, at 335-36.
61. See, e.g., J. Russell McElroy, Some Observations Concerning the Discretions Re-
posed in Trial Judges by the American Law Institute's Code of Evidence, in MODEL CODE
EVIDENCE 356-64 (1942); Dolan, supra note 50, at 231-33, 243-44; Jack B. Weinstein &
Margaret A. Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4
GA. L. REV. 43, 81, 83-85, 92, 108 (1969).
62. MODEL CODE EVIDENCE VII (1942).
63. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (citing THAYER, supra note 19,
at 266, 516; 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1421, 1422, 1714 (1923)).
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danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading
the jury, or (c) unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable
64ground to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
The ALI reporter asserted that the Model Code anticipated ex-
cluded relevant evidence would be evidence of only "slight" rele-
vance. 65 The Model Code and those writing in support of it made
no analysis of whether this was constitutional.
When proposed, Model Code Rule 303 "served as the lightning
rod for a large part of the abuse which the Model Code drew, ul-
timately contributing to the legislative defeat the code suffered in
every jurisdiction."6 The reporter for the Model Code accused the
legal community of trying to "have it both ways"--"judges not be-
ing the kind of people we could trust" and "juries being such very
bad instrumentalities for the determination of fact."67 For exam-
ple, Rule 303 of the Model Code permits exclusion of relevant evi-
dence if admission would cause undue consumption of trial time;
yet, in the ALI Proceedings considering adoption of the final draft
of the Model Code, Judge Van Voorhis called this a "dangerous
provision" because some judges, given this level of discretion,
simply "would close the case and go fishing."68 Neither the federal
courts nor any state adopted the Model Code. 69
D. FRE 403
FRE 403 has been characterized as the "cornerstone" of the
Federal Rules.7" Where Model Rule 303 died on the altar of grant-
ing judges more evidentiary control over the facts that went to ju-
64. MODEL CODE EVID. R. 303.
65. Morgan, supra note 20, at 223 (remarks of Mr. Morgan).
66. Dolan, supra note 50, at 221-22.
67. Morgan, supra note 20, at 223; accord Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing The Politics of
[Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HAST. L.J. 843, 849 (2002) ("[W]hen the Model Code was finally
published in 1942, the opposition became loud and fierce, led by Dean Wigmore who criti-
cized the discretion the Model Code gave to trial judges. ").
68. Morgan, supra note 20, at 221. The reporter for the ALI responded that if his di-
rection was to draft sufficiently detailed rules that a judge lacked room to abuse discre-
tion, then the ALI would have to find another reporter. Id. at 222.
69. For a review of evidence law during the interim period between Model Code and
Federal Rules, see Scallen, supra note 67, at 851-54.
70. Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfair-
ly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 497 (1983) (quoting Herbert Peterfreund,
Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts: Article IV, in 25 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE B. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 80, 83 (1970)).
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ries, FRE 403 codified the same conceptual idea. If "the origin of
evidentiary rules is often directly tied to concerns over the jury's
ability to render a verdict free of inflamed passions,"7 then FRE
403 gave full throat to those that distrust,72 at least if a case was
tried in front of a judge inclined to exercise discretionary exclu-
sion.
The mechanics of FRE 403 are to keep from the jury, for ex-
trinsic reasons, evidence that unquestionably is of consequence to
a matter properly part of the case. FRE 403 states, "The court
may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: un-
fair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evi-
dence."72 FRE 403 starts with the premise that it only applies to
evidence that is "relevant," which the Advisory Committee's
Notes explains reaches even to evidence whose relevance is "un-
questioned."74 FRE 401 defines "relevant evidence" to include both
the notions of logical relevance and legal relevance.75 For our pur-
poses, the focus is on legal relevance, which in the language of
FRE 401 is evidence "of consequence in determining the action."76
The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 401 expands upon this
concept, noting that the evidence must bear on a matter "properly
provable in the case."77
By its terms, FRE 403 seeks to make trials more efficient and
verdicts more accurate.7" FRE 403 identifies three "danger[s]"
71. Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional Involvement in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (2008) (citing JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 123 (1949); Wallace D. Lob,
The Evidence and Trial Procedure: The Law, Social Policy, and Psychological Research, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 13, 15 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence
S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Per-
ception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 337 (1995)).
72. See Teter, supra note 71, at 166.
73. FED. R. EVID. 403.
74. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note. This clarification by the Advisory
Committee makes this article more straightforward, as it avoids an exploration of how rel-
evant evidence must be in order to be admissible. See generally George F. James, Relevan-
cy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689 (1941).
75. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
76. FED. R. EVID. 401.
77. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
78. "[E]liminat[ing] unjustifiable expense and delay" and ascertaining the truth also
are set forth in FRE 102 as among the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
whole. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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that justify exclusion of relevant evidence-"unfair prejudice, con-
fusing the issues" and "misleading the jury."79 All three are con-
cerns about the accuracy of verdicts. FRE 403 lists three "consid-
erations" to account for as a possible reason to exclude relevant
evidence--"undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence." ° All three are concerns about the efficiency
of trials. Indeed, Model Code Rule 303 had a seventh dan-
ger/consideration-surprise---which was more of a "fairness" con-
cern, but the advisory committee drafting FRE 403 intentionally
omitted surprise because a motion for continuance was consid-
ered the more proper solution.8
FRE 403 proposed the same balance between judge and jury-
and concomitant encroachment of the jury's power-that argua-
bly had doomed the Model Rules. When writing about the then-
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, including 403, commentators
Jack Weinstein and Margaret Berger explained the proposed
Rule as follows:
A principle reason for admitting all relevant evidence is that, gener-
ally, the probability of ascertaining the truth about a given proposi-
tion increases as the amount of the trier's knowledge grows. Never-
theless, the goal of ascertaining the truth of a particular proposition
is not always served by the indiscriminate admission of all relevant
evidence. Moreover, truth finding is not always the law's overriding
aim.8
2
Weinstein and Berger argued rules of evidence and procedure,
in addition to truth finding, should be "economizing resources, in-
spiring confidence, supporting independent social policies, per-
mitting ease in prediction and application, adding to the efficien-
cy of the entire legal system, and tranquilizing disputants."" The
reporter of the Model Code of Evidence had argued that without
Rule 303, trial dockets would be so clogged that courts would be
considered incompetent. 84 Weinstein and Berger shared this view,
arguing that a system seeking "impeccable precision" would
involve "extraordinary expense and delay," while "rough and
79. FED. R. EVID. 403.
80. Id.
81. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403, 46 F.R.D. 161, 226-27
(1969).
82. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 61, at 70 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. See Morgan, supra note 20, at 223-24.
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ready, approximation of the facts" would be "much more effec-
tive. , 5
Yet, in contrast to proposed Model Rule of Evidence 303, FRE
403 was not controversial. 6 FRE 403 "received virtually no atten-
tion by Congress and was adopted as submitted.""7 As the Senate
Committee hearing transcripts explained, the rule did "not pre-
sent significant theoretical or conceptual difficulties[;] it merely
codifies traditional concessions to the human limitations of jurors
and recognizes that mortal time is finite.""8
As the Senate Committee Report alludes, the Federal Rules of
Evidence made a choice-efficiency and clarity could trump com-
pleteness. But nowhere was there consideration of whether the
Constitution gave room for that choice. To the contrary, "[tihe
Advisory Committee drafting these rules of evidence deliberately
decided not to deal with constitutional requirements."8 Court de-
cisions pre-dating, presaging, and actually informing FRE 403 did
not even acknowledge the possibility of constitutional overtones."
FRE 403 has become a primary tool of excluding evidence.
Even early on, commentators noticed a mounting number and va-
riety of cases applying FRE 403. 91 FRE 403 is the "universal 'fall-
back"' objections2 "applicable to almost every evidentiary issue,"93
and "the major rule that explicitly recognizes the large discre-
tionary role of the judge in controlling the introduction of
85. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 61, at 71.
86. See Dolan, supra note 50, at 221-22.
87. Id. at 221; accord, WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 58, § 5211. ("During Congres-
sional consideration, Rule 403 was labeled 'controversial.'... [But] Congress never seri-
ously considered any changes in the rule ... ." (citations omitted)).
88. The Federal Rules of Evidence: An Overview and Critique, in Rules of Evidence:
Hearing on H.R. 54603 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 139 (1974).
89. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 61, at 75.
90. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449, 459
(1st Cir. 1963); United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1944).
91. See Gold, supra note 70, at 498,500-03.
92. ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS § 5.03 (3d ed. 2011).
93. DEBORAH JONES MERRIr & RIc SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE
FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM 71 (2009).
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evidence."94 Today, "[1]itigants invoke Rule 403 quite often,"95 and
FRE 403 is "increasingly utilized by the courts."96
III. THE OFTEN FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH
AMENDMENTS, AND WHAT THEY PROTECT
The notion that the majority of the populace is ill-suited to
make, and therefore should not make, decisions of import is at
least as old as Plato's The Republic.97 It is, however, a notion the
United States Constitution rejects. In two branches of tripartite
government-the executive and legislative-the vehicle of direct
representative democracy rejects it. In the judicial branch, the
Constitution rejects it by creating the right to a jury trial-and
does so in three places-Article III, the Sixth Amendment, and
the Seventh Amendment. In doing so, the Constitution reflects a
very different view of juries than the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The writers of both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Consti-
tution perceive juries as potentially confused, inflamed, distract-
ed, and bored. On this basis, the Federal Rules of Evidence keep
swaths of evidence away from the jury. The Constitution, by con-
trast, empowers juries, warts and all, as the de facto only and
preferred alternative to bench trials.
The inclusion of jury trial rights in the Constitution, and the
reasons for doing so, were far from casual.99 At the time of the
drafting of the Constitution, the right to trial by jury was proba-
bly the only right universally secured by the first American state
constitutions."99 Not surprisingly, the draft federal Constitution
included a detailed right to a jury: "The trial of all criminal of-
fences (except in cases of impeachments) shall be in the state
where they shall be committed; and shall be by Jury."'' 0 Perhaps
94. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, STUDENT EDITION OF WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE BASED ON WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6.02 (8th ed. 2007).
95. MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 93, at 71.
96. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 94, at 6-19 (stating that motions in limine are
increasingly being used to exclude evidence based on Rule 403).
97. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 221-50 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1991).
98. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968).
99. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 341 (1970) (quoting L. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY
281 (1960)).
100. Draft of Constitution, Aug. 6, 1787, in JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
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surprisingly, the draft Constitution was silent concerning juries
in civil cases. 0 '
The reaction was swift and at times virulent. 1 2 During the pe-
riod when ratification of the Constitution was debated and uncer-
tain, one pamphleteer succinctly described the centrality of trial
by jury to the American Revolution: "[W]e have bled for it.""3 The
same author continued, concerning civil cases, "and [we] are now
almost ready to trifle it away."14 This was not hyperbole-civil
trial by jury was, after all, targeted by the British through the
Stamp Act, which begat the blockade of Boston and the resulting
war. 10' An Anti-Federalist concerned about the silence of the draft
Constitution on the topic of civil juries asserted accusingly that "a
few of our countrymen should consider jurors.., as ignorant,
troublesome bodies, which ought not to have any share in the
concerns of government.""' One Anti-Federalist pamphlet ac-
cused the drafters of forgetting the lessons of the trial of John Pe-
ter Zenger."° Another wrote that trial by jury "is the only thing
that will save us.""' Similar sentiments have been well-
documented."' The Federalists responded that they had no inten-
tion of eliminat-
AMERICA 337 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott, eds. 1920).
101. See Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the "Historical
Test" for Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REV. 467, 471-72 (2010).
102. Id. at 472-73.
103. Essay by One of the Common People, December 3, 1787, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 566, 566 (Neil
H. Cogan ed., 1997).
104. Id.
105. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 393-97 (1999); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America:
Scenes From an Unappreciated History, 44 HAST. L.J. 579, 594-96 (1993).
106. The Federal Farmer, No. 4, October 12, 1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 553, 554.
107. See Cincinnatus, No. 1, November 1, 1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 558, 558-59.
John Peter Zenger was a New York publisher who was acquitted of sedition in 1735. The
case was a historic juncture both for freedom of the press and for the power of a jury-in
that instance, through nullification-to act as a check on government power. See Douglas
Linder, The Trial of John Peter Zenger: An Account, http://Iaw2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/zenger/zenger.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
108. The People: Unconstitutionalism, December 10, 1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 568,
568.
109. See, e.g., Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80
HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966); Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
20131 1095
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ing civil juries and that the silence of the draft Constitution was
being misinterpreted. 110
The full-throated defense by both Federalists and Anti-
Federalists of juries was not based on a Pollyannaish view of the
capabilities of jurors. Juries were accused of, and perhaps even
believed at least sometimes to be, "ignorant.""' Jurors were said
to be unable to "distinguish between right and wrong.""2 Jurors
were described as decision makers "by chance,""3 "stupid,""4 "un-
principled,""' and potentially imposing injustice by "ignorance or
knavery.""' 6 Nonetheless, juries were argued to be preferable to
judges: "Destroy juries and everything is prostrated to judges,
who may easily disguise law, by suppressing and varying fact."'17
Eliminating trial by jury "will destroy all check on the judiciary
authority, render it almost impossible to convict judges of corrup-
tion, and may lay the foundation of that gradual and silent attack
on individuals, by which the approaches of tyranny become irre-
sistible."1 8 "The temptations to prostitution, which judges might
have to surmount, must certainly be much fewer while the co-
operation of a jury is necessary, than they might be if they had
themselves the exclusive determination of all causes." 1 9
The argument for broad jury rights won the day. The draft
Constitution was ratified, subject to the commitment that the
First Congress amend it in several particulars to confirm and
protect various individual rights."'° The Bill of Rights included
two guarantees of jury rights. The "right to trial by jury" clause of
110. Wolfram, supra note 109, at 673; but see Henderson, supra note 109, at 296-97.
111. A Farmer, No. 4, March 21, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 579, 581.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Aristocrotis, April 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS,
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 582, 582.
115. A [New Hampshire] Farmer, No. 3, June 6, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 586, 586.
116. Id.
117. A Farmer, No. 4, March 21, 1788, supra note 111, at 580.
118. Address of a Minority of the Maryland Convention, May 1, 1788, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note
103, at 582, 582.
119. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
120. See e.g., THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 493-506 (listing many drafts of Amendment VII of U.S. Con-
stitution in First Congress).
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the Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law."'2 ' The Seventh Amendment, in its entirety,
provides,
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
122
In other words, the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution
understood that juries could be misled, or corrupted, or confused.
Some argued to not preserve a right to jury trial because, in light
of the perceived weaknesses of at least some juries, judges were
preferable.'23 But the sentiment that prevailed-with open eyes
about juries-was that juries, for all of their flaws, were prefera-
ble to judges. As Thomas Jefferson wrote to Abbe Arnoux,
[W]e all know that permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps,
that being known they are liable to be tempted by bribery, that they
are misled by favor, by relationship, by spirit of party, by a devotion
to the Executive or Legislative2, that it is better to leave a cause to
the decision of cross and pile, than to that of a judge biased to one
side .... Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best
be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it
is better to leave them out of the legislative. 123
As Jefferson's words allude, the constitutional enshrinement of
trial by jury is not so much a reflection of trust in the objective
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The text of Article III referred to juries in the same state,
but made no mention of district-this edit may be what primarily motivated clarifying the
Article III jury right in the Sixth Amendment. See George C. Thomas III, When Constitu-
tional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure,
100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 177-78 (2001). For another explanation of the difference between,
and reason for, the Constitution's two clauses addressing criminal jury trial rights, see
Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article Ill's Jury Trial Provision, Original.
ism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 380-84 (2012).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
123. See, e.g., Remarks of John Marshall on June 20, 1788, During the Virginia State
Convention Concerning Ratification of the Constitution, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 540, 544 ("If
we can expect a fair decision any where, may we not expect justice to be done by the judg-
es... ?").
124. "Cross and pile" was a game of chance akin to heads or tails. WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 541 (3d ed. 2002).
125. Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux, July 19, 1789, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 595, 596.
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competency of juries, as it is a reflection of the relative competen-
cy of juries as compared to judges. 2 6 Put yet another way, since
"the procedural system in which judges rule on what the jury will
hear implies a judicial posture of superior cognitive ability and
greater freedom from bias,"127 one might argue that the Constitu-
tion entrusts fact finding to juries despite recognizing (or at least
presuming) that judges are smarter than juries.2 '
There is one other aspect of the constitutional history directly
pertinent to an evaluation of the constitutionality of FRE 403. As
is shown even by the above brief review of the words of Ameri-
cans from the time, juries were understood to have all of the cog-
nitive flaws that today animate FRE 403.129 Yet, in stark contrast
to FRE 403, which in response to these concerns seeks to limit the
range and nature of evidence juries will consider, the Constitu-
tion anticipates that juries will consider wide-ranging evidence.
This becomes apparent from the ratification debate concerning
"vicinage" 3' and the resulting language found in the Sixth
Amendment.
A jury of the "vicinage" is a jury from the geographic vicinity,13'
and in the eighteenth century was perceived to be a jury more
likely to be able to bring their local knowledge, external to the
126. See Teter, supra note 71, at 163-64; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968) (asserting that the jury provides an accused with an "inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccen-
tric judge").
127. Luebsdorf, supra note 41, at 1254.
128. There is empirical evidence suggesting that judges are no better or different than
jurors in evaluating potentially inflammatory or distracting evidence. See Chris Guthrie et
al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 808-10 (2001); Joseph Sanders,
The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert
Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 925 (2003); see also Donald A. Dripps, Relevant But
Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence: Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a
Defense, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1400-02 (1996).
129. See supra notes 106-08, 111-19 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., The Federal Farmer, No. 2, Oct. 9, 1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 551, 551-52;
The Federal Farmer, in No. 3, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 552, 552-53; The Fed-
eral Farmer, No. 4, Oct. 12, 1787, supra note 106, at 554; A Democratic Federalist, Oct. 17,
1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 554, 554-55; Centinel, No. 2, Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note
103, at 557, 557-58; A Son of Liberty, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 103, at 562, 562.
131. See Blinka, supra note 49, at 562.
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trial evidence, to an evaluation of the trial evidence. 3 ' The Sixth
Amendment incorporates a guarantee of vicinage by requiring a
jury "of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." 13 3 Vicinage juries were not precisely "self-informing"
in that juries did not do external investigation and were not se-
lected based upon having direct knowledge, but vicinage juries
explicitly were permitted to reach verdicts based on their own
knowledge, even when parties presented no trial evidence at all.3
In other words, constitutional preservation of jury vicinage con-
firms that the jury was expected to bring external evidence to trial
decision making and that trial verdicts were not dependent on the
evidence presented at trial-quite an inapposite view of juries
and trials to that of the contemporary Federal Rules of Evidence.
IV. JURIES HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE To BE THE
EXCLUSIVE FACT FINDER
The Constitution three times guarantees a right to trial by jury
but not once defines what the precise scope of the jury's role is to
be. Given the richly variant traditions of jury roles of the day, as
described in Federalist No. 83, that omission could not be due to
an assumed single, objectively correct answer.'35 Indeed, the lack
of consensus on the role of the jury was the proffered reason for
the initial silence of the draft Constitution on civil jury trials.'36
In order to determine whether FRE 403, by keeping relevant
evidence away from the jury, is an unconstitutional encroachment
on the role of the jury, the precise role of the jury has to be de-
fined. Case law has done so. The irreducible minimum role of the
jury is as the finder of fact. And more to the point, the jury is the
exclusive finder of fact. Legal reform that has encroached on the
jury's fact finding role uniformly falls as unconstitutional.
132. Id. at 562-63; A Son of Liberty, Nov. 8, 1787, supra note 130, at 562.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
134. See Blinka, supra note 49, at 569-70.
135. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 500-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
136. See Klein, supra note 101, at 472-73.
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A. The Right to Trial by Jury is the Right to Fact Finding by a
Jury
The Supreme Court has long recognized the core prerogative of
the jury as the fact finder. In 1897, the Supreme Court held that,
while the Seventh Amendment "does not attempt to regulate
matters of pleading or practice," it does require "that questions of
fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the
court shall not assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury
or to itself such prerogative.' 37 In 1943, the Court made a similar
holding in Galloway v. United States, stating that courts could
apply evidence rules so long as the "fundamental elements" of tri-
al by jury remained.'38 And as Professor Moses has correctly ob-
served,
Although the Court in Galloway did not articulate what it thought
the fundamental elements of the jury trial were, it cited as authority
such cases as Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., Ex
parte Peterson, and Walker v. New Mexico, all of which defined as
fundamental the jury's role as the finder of facts.
139
The fact finding function of the jury has been the lodestar when
evaluating procedural modifications to jury trial practice. As the
Court stated in Dimick v. Schiedt, "Maintenance of the jury as a
fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a
place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtail-
ment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care."" ' Professor Moses concludes,
[W]hen the Court has approved changes to the jury trial right, it has
insisted that such changes must not undermine the fundamental
role of the jury to find facts. When the Court has not approved such
changes, its justification has also been that of protecting the role of
the jury to find facts. "
137. Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
138. 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943); see also Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the
Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 671 (1918).
139. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Sev-
enth Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 201 (2000); see also Balt. &
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Scott, supra note 138, at 672, 675
(arguing that the essential elements of trial by jury included that the jury decided issues
of fact).
140. 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
141. Moses, supra note 139, at 202.
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Stated from a different viewpoint, but reaching the same conclu-
sion, Professor Burns argues that throughout history there have
been two forms of trial struggling against each other, but under
both, the jury remains the finder of fact in jury trials.4 2 "The
commitment to jury trial runs so deep in the United States that
every aspect of trial procedure reflects the assumption of jury
factfinding."1' The Court describes the "essential feature" of the
criminal jury as "the interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen.' 44
B. The Jury is the Exclusive Finder of Fact
What is less explicitly addressed by courts and commentators
is whether the jury is the exclusive fact finder. Put another way,
it is whether the constitutional guarantees of a jury's fact finding
role prohibit a judge from taking away any factual issues, or any
evidence relevant to factual issues, from the jury. The second
phrase of the Seventh Amendment-"no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law"'45-could be read as ex-
plicitly affirming the exclusive fact finding role of the jury. Yet,
through mechanisms such as FRE 403, orders granting FRCP 50
motions, and appellate review and reversal of jury verdicts,
courts undeniably do influence and take away and reverse jury
fact finding. 46 Plainly, the second sentence of the Seventh
Amendment is not considered to settle the matter, even in civil
trials. So is the jury actually the exclusive fact finder?
Try this thought experiment: Envision a criminal case where
the defense has exercised the right to trial by jury. The judge cer-
tainly could not enter an order that the sole issue to be deter-
mined by the jury is whether the person seated at the defense ta-
ble is the same person named in the indictment. In other words,
the judge could not reserve the determination of guilt to the
bench, even if the judge thinks he or she would be a better deci-
142. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 9, 64-65 (2009).
143. Dripps, supra note 128, at 1393.
144. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). See generally Siegel, supra note 121,
at 395-96 (discussing colonial reticence to ever let judges decide facts in a criminal trial).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
146. See generally Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 491-93 (1935) (Stone, J., dissent-
ing).
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sion maker and even if the judge is right. But would the judge vi-
olate Article III and the Sixth Amendment if the judge entered an
order limiting the length of time each party had to present evi-
dence or requiring, through the vehicle of judicial notice, that the
jury accept a fact as settled rather than hear evidence and decide
it for themselves? Are these differences in degree or something
more fundamental? Is there a textual difference between the
Sixth and Seventh Amendment that would support a different
answer in a civil case? And-although this last question wanders
hopelessly far from the original scenario-if the answers to these
questions indicate that the jury is the exclusive fact finder, then
how can states (as many states do) impose damages caps, rather
than leave it to the jury to quantify damages?
Reviewing the answer courts give to these facial encroach-
ments on jury responsibilities-the propriety of time limits in
criminal and civil trials, or how the jury should be instructed on
judicially noticed facts in criminal and civil trials, or the propriety
of damages caps legislation in personal injury actions-is instruc-
tive in determining exactly what the Constitution guarantees
when the Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial.
In the last thirty years, a handful of published opinions have
addressed the propriety of time limits in criminal trials.'47 Typical
among these opinions is United States v. Reaves, wherein the dis-
trict court colorfully described the underlying necessity for time
limits on criminal evidence presentations:
It would seem that early in the career of every trial lawyer, he or she
has lost a case by leaving something out, and thereupon resolved
never again to omit even the most inconsequential item of possible
evidence from any future trial. Thereafter, in an excess of caution
the attorney tends to overtry his case by presenting vast quantities
of cumulative or marginally relevant evidence. In civil cases, eco-
nomics place some natural limits on such zeal. The fact that the at-
torney's fee may not be commensurate with the time required to pre-
sent the case thrice over imposes some restraint. In a criminal case,
however, the prosecution, at least in the federal system, seems not to
be subject to such fiscal constraints, and the attorney's enthusiasm
for tautology is virtually unchecked.
4 8
147. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Hildebrand, 928 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Iowa 1996); United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp.
1575 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
148. 636 F. Supp. at 1576.
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For this reason, the district court, invoking its "theoretically un-
challengeable" "inherent power.., to manage its workload," im-
posed "reasonable time limits" that were "not arbitrary" to avoid
"wasteful, duplicative, and inefficient" presentation of not "strict-
ly irrelevant" evidence. 1
49
By characterizing the excluded evidence as "wasteful, duplica-
tive, and inefficient," albeit not "strictly irrelevant,"" the district
court highlighted its view that the record made no showing that
time limits caused the advocates to edit from the trial evidence of
any importance. The district court opinion did not mention or per-
form any analysis of the constitutionality of these time limits
when measured against Sixth Amendment jury rights. There
would have been no reason to do so, given the rationales of the
decision, which were that the evidence "excluded" is decided upon
by the advocates rather than the court, and that no material evi-
dence was excluded.'' In other words, the criminal cases address-
ing time limits do not frame it as a right to jury trial issue be-
cause the cases begin from the premise that time limits, when
imposed, still leave time for presentation of all relevant and ma-
terial evidence and that no such evidence is being excluded by the
judge.
And, of course, this is not well-populated jurisprudence. Time
limits in criminal trials inevitably trigger an intuitive judicial ret-
icence to tread on the accused's ability to develop a defense." 2
Thus, published decisions discussing time limits in criminal cases
are rare.
By contrast, there is more jurisprudence addressing the propri-
ety of time limits in civil actions-much of which is cited and dis-
cussed in the few cases approving time limits in criminal cases.
Also, while the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure make no
mention of the possibility of trial time limits, Federal Rule of Civ-
il Procedure 16(c)(2)(O) explicitly contemplates that a court can
impose time limits on the presentation of evidence at trial. 153 Yet,
the jurisprudence on civil trial limits, like the cases in criminal
149. Id. at 1576-77, 1580.
150. Id. at 1576.
151. Id. at 1580.
152. See 44 F.3d at 1157.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(O).
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trials, is stone silent about the possible constitutional hurdle of
encroaching on jury trial rights.
Added to FRCP 16 in 1993, subsection (c)(2)(O) provides that in
any pretrial conference, the court may "establish[] a reasonable
limit on the time allowed to present evidence." 4 The Advisory
Committee explained,
It supplements the power of the court to limit the extent of evidence
under Rules 403 and 611(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
typically would be invoked as a result of developments during trial.
Limits on the length of trial established at a conference in advance of
trial can provide the parties with a better opportunity to determine
priorities and exercise selectivity in presenting evidence than when
limits are imposed during trial.
Of course, while imposing time limits in a civil action will force
choices concerning what evidence to introduce," ' nominally the
decision is made by parties and their advocates, not judges. Thus,
court-imposed time limits do not necessarily implicate concerns
about the propriety of judges excluding potentially relevant evi-
dence.
Several courts have addressed the matter since the 1993
amendments."' As a general matter, the focus of analysis by the
appellate courts has been on the undeniably laudable goals of the
relevant procedural and evidence rules-accuracy and efficien-
cy-and the countervailing vaguely described goal of fairness,
without any reference to the constitutional prerogative of the ju-
ry. More specifically, as in Reaves, civil trial time limits are seen
as necessary tools to reign in attorneys. 5 "
154. Id.
155. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory committee note to the 1993 Amendments; see also Pat-
rick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes To Trial: Time Limits For Federal Civil Trials, 35
ARiz. L. REV. 663 (1993) (evaluating the potential necessity of allowing time limits in civil
trials).
156. Judge William Schwarzer argues that "lawyers, if permitted, will try every issue,
present every witness and offer every exhibit that might possible persuade a jury to return
a verdict in their favor." William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, reprinted in 132 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1991).
157. See, e.g., Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 941 (9th Cir. 2001); Crabtree v. Nat'l
Steel Corp., 261 F.3d 715, 720-21 (7th Cir. 2001); Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d
846, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1996); Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604,
608-11 (3d Cir. 1995); Schwartz v. Fortune Magazine, 193 F.R.D. 144, 148-49 (S.D. N.Y.
2000).
158. United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
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For example, in Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., the Third Circuit explained,
The rules repeatedly embody the principle that trials should be both
fair and efficient. Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action." Similarly, the Federal Rules
of Evidence "shall be construed to secure.., elimination of unjustifi-
able expense and delay." More particularly, Fed.R.Evid. 403 allows
judges to exclude even relevant evidence because of "considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
* After all, "'it has never been supposed that a party has an ab-
solute right to force upon an unwilling tribunal an unending and su-
perfluous mass of testimony limited only by [its] own judgment and
whim.'"
However, because by their very nature such procedures can result
in courts dispensing with the general practice to evaluate each piece
of offered evidence individually, district courts should not exercise
this discretion as a matter of course. As one court has put it, wit-
nesses should not be excluded "on the basis of mere numbers." Ra-
ther, a district court should impose time limits only when necessary,
after making an informed analysis based on a review of the parties'
proposed witness lists and proffered testimony, as well as their esti-
mates of trial time .... But still the courts need not allow parties ex-
cessive time so as to turn a trial into a circus. After all, a court's re-
sources are finite and a court must dispose of much litigation. In• • 159
short, the litigants in a particular case do not own the court.
Similarly, in Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., the Fifth Circuit
reasoned,
The role of a federal judge is not that of a mere moderator. Fur-
thermore, the courts of this country labor under heavy caseloads,
and in order to accommodate these caseloads some concessions to
expediency are necessary. However, if the goal of expediency is given
higher priority than the pursuit of justice, then the bench and the
bar both will have failed in their duty to uphold the Constitution and
the underlying principles upon which our profession is founded.
Speed is necessary, and the limited capabilities of the judicial system
certainly should be considered in determining whether to impose
limits on the introduction of evidence and the length of trial. Howev-
er, such considerations must be addressed with a cautious respect
for the requirements necessary to achieve a fair trial. 6 °
With only one exception, no published decision even acknowledg-
es a potential conflict with the constitutional right to trial by jury.
159. Duquesne, 66 F.3d at 609-10 (citations omitted).
160. Sims, 77 F.3d at 849 (citations omitted).
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That decision is Frazier v. Honeywell International, Inc. 161 But in
that opinion, the district court did not analyze the constitutional
issue at all; instead, it held that the claim was not properly pre-
served.'62
None of the time limits jurisprudence explicitly answers the
question of the role of the jury as exclusive fact finder. But one
can tease out of the jurisprudence a set of doctrinal threads that
give shape to the answer. There is an underlying assumption that
a jury should hear evidence of unquestioned relevance. 163 There is
recognition that it can distort a trial if a judge excludes evidence
from jury consideration.'64 There is an understanding that the
distortion can be ameliorated if the decision on what evidence to
present is made by the parties and advocates, rather than by the
judge. 1 65 There is an attempt simultaneously to therefore shift the
decision to the parties and the advocates and to promote efficien-
cy and accuracy of trials.'66 There is a description of accuracy and
efficiency as valid system goals."' There is recognition of a coun-
tervailing constitutional interest in a fair trial.66 And there is a
conclusion that time limits are permissible so long as there is not
an impairment of a fair trial due to the exclusion by the judge of
too much relevant evidence. 66 There is never any analysis of
whether the constitutional guarantees of jury trials allow the sac-
rifice of full presentation of relevant evidence.
While the jurisprudence arising from the procedural reform of
trial time limits disappointingly does not answer whether it is the
jury's prerogative to hear and weigh for itself all relevant evi-
dence, the text and legislative history of the evidence rules on ju-
dicial notice do answer that question, at least for criminal juries.
FRE 201 provides for judicial notice of adjudicative facts' ° and
161. 518 F. Supp. 2d 831 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
162. Id. at 840-41.
163. See Sims, 77 F.3d at 849.
164. See id.
165. See United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
166. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 608-11 (3d Cir.
1995).
167. See Sims, 77 F.3d at 849.
168. See id.
169. See Duquesne, 66 F.3d at 609 (citing SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 13
(D. Conn. 1977)).
170. The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish between legislative facts and adjudica-
tive facts. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note to subdivision (a). Adjudicative
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further provides that such facts are binding on the jury except in
criminal trials: "In a civil case, the court must instruct the jury to
accept the noticed fact as conclusive. In a criminal case, the court
must instruct the jury that it may or may not accept the noticed
fact as conclusive.
"
,
17
The legislative history of FRE 201 explains the difference be-
tween judicial notice in criminal and civil trial. On February 5,
1973, after several rounds of drafting and revisions, Chief Justice
Burger, on behalf of the Supreme Court, sent to Congress the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.'72 Congress largely accepted
all of the proposed rules as written; one of the few "Rules Signifi-
cantly Amended"'73 was FRE 201(g), which Congress amended to
provide that judicially noticed facts would not bind a criminal ju-
ry because giving a mandatory jury instruction on a factual issue
to a criminal jury would be "inappropriate" as "contrary to the
spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."'74 Congress
made no mention of the Seventh Amendment.
The House Report, read in conjunction with the Advisory
Committee's Note to FRE 201, constitutes the most direct pub-
lished discussion of whether the constitutionally enshrined fact
finding role of the jury means the jury is the exclusive fact finder.
The Advisory Committee's Note explains that, in order for a fact
to be judicially noticeable, the fact must be "beyond reasonable
controversy."'75 And yet, as the House Report emphasizes, in or-
der to comply with jury trial rights, even those facts go to a jury
in a criminal trial.'76 It would seem that the constitutional right
factual determinations are the facts of a particular case; in other words, adjudicative facts
are the facts that would be decided by juries in a jury trial, such as who, what, where, and
when. See id. Legislative facts are the assumptions or determinations a judge or legisla-
ture would make in determining matters of policy, such as the impact of a particular poli-
cy on society. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY § 201.2 (7th ed.
2011). The Federal Rules of Evidence only address judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
FED. R. EVID. 201(a).
171. FED. R. EVID. 201(f).
172. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7077.
173. Id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7080. For a fuller but concise
summary of the initial drafting and adopting of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Teter
supra note 70, at 157-61.
174. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 7075, 7080; accord
United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219, 223-24 (6th Cir. 1978); State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d
600, 603 (Utah 1951).
175. FED. R. EVID. 201(b) advisory committee's note.
176. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7080 (not-
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to a jury trial, at least in a criminal trial, does equate to the right
of the jury to decide all facts and to decide what weight to give all
evidence. 1
77
In other words, when jury trial rights are remembered and fac-
tored into consideration, jury trial rights are treated as sacro-
sanct. Having identified the Sixth Amendment jury trial concern,
Congress was so uneasy with encroaching on jury prerogatives
that it would not even permit instructing the jury to accept as
true something as innocuous as undisputable facts. Put yet an-
other way, in criminal trials the jury is the exclusive finder of
fact, no matter what.
There is no explanation of why there would not be an identical
Seventh Amendment concern for judicial notice in civil trials. It
may be that, as often seems the case, the Seventh Amendment
simply is not in anyone's consciousness. Certainly the text of the
Sixth Amendment--"trial, by an impartial jury"178-when com-
S179pared to the text of the Seventh Amendment-"trial by jury" -does not support any distinction.
Legislatively imposed damage caps in civil litigation are anoth-
er area of law potentially infringing on the parameters of the con-
stitutional role of the jury. At first blush, capping damages
awards without reference to the evidence of actual damages is a
possible encroachment on the jury's fact finding role.
Here, the analysis is done under state-guaranteed jury trial
rights. The Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in a civil
case is not incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment as a
restriction on the states.80 But a near-identical guarantee is with-
ing that all facts judicially noticed go to the jury, but a discretionary instruction is allowed
for criminal trials).
177. See Jones, 580 F.2d at 224 ("Congress intended to preserve the jury's traditional
prerogative to ignore even uncontroverted facts .... [Tihe Supreme Court's rule violated
the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional right to a jury trial."). The proponents of
judicial notice cited by the Official Comment to FRE 201 argue for it as a matter of effi-
ciency, and rarely if ever consider it as a matter of propriety. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A
System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVE OF LAW:
ESSAY FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOT 83 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1964); Arthur John
Keefe et al., Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664, 669-70
(1950); Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 271 (1944).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
180. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.-, - n.13, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13
(2010).
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in forty-eight state constitutions, and in the two states where it is
not in the constitution, it is in their statutes or codes."' And so,
there is a body of state court jurisprudence addressing whether
damages caps infringe on the fact finding role of juries.
Many states have damages caps of one sort or another. As of
the time these words are being penned, at least thirteen states
capped punitive damages in all or some circumstances. 2 At least
twenty-one states have capped non-economic damages in all or
some circumstances. 83 At least seven states have some other form
of a damages cap.8 4 Some of these states have court decisions an-
181. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23;
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7 amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 16; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16;
C.R.C.P. 38(a); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19, amended by CONN. CONST. art. IV; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XI; HAW. CONS. art. I, § 13;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 20; IOWA CONST. art.
I, § 9; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; KY. CONST. § 7; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731
(2011); ME. CONST. art. I, § 20; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. V; MASS. CONST. pt.
I, art. XV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31;
MO. CONST. art. I, § 22 (a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26.; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XX; N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 9; N.M. CONST. art.
II, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1); N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. art. I, §
17; PA. CONST. art. I, § 6.; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art.
VI, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. XII; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; W. VA. CONST. art.
III, § 13; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9.
182. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Repl. Vol. 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (Repl.
Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (Repl. Vol. 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-
5.1 (Supp. 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604 (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.05 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-220 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Repl. Ed.
2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1D-25 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011); TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 41.008 (Cum. Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007
& Cum. Supp. 2012).
183. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Repl. Vol. 2012); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (Repl. Vol.
1997 & Cum. Supp. 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 2012); HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-
8.7 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (Repl. Vol. 2010 &
Cum. Supp. 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & CuM. Supp. 2012); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 4313.9 (Compact Ed. 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H
(West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAwS § 600.1483 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2012); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (Cum. Supp. 2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (Repl. Vol. 2008);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2012); Act of Aug. 7, 2002, ch.
3, sec. 5, 2002 Nev. Laws 18th Spec. Sess. 3, 6-7 (repealed 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
42-02 (Repl. Vol. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (Repl. Vol. 2010 & Supp. 2012);
Affordable Access to Healthcare Act, ch. 390, sec. 6, 2003 Okla. Laws 1678, 1681-82 (ex-
pired 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710 (West 2013), invalidated by Lakin v. Senco Prods.,
Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220(A) (Cum. Supp. 2012); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 74.301 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1
(Repl. Vol. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West 2013) (damages cap for medical malprac-
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alyzing whether damages caps infringed on the right to trial by
jury. It is those court decisions that are of interest.
The consensus of the state jurisprudence is that a state can ex-
pand or contract a substantive right, but once that right is de-
fined, it is for a jury to determine factually what happened in a
particular case. For this reason, several state supreme courts
have held damages caps to infringe on the constitutional right to
trial by jury.'85 The Alabama Supreme Court explained, "A jury
determination of the amount of damages is the essence of the
right to trial by jury.""6 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned,
"[B]ecause the jury verdict is being arbitrarily capped.., the
plaintiff [is not] receiving the constitutional benefit of a jury trial
as we have heretofore understood that right."' 87 Yet, for the same
reason, several other state supreme courts have held damages
caps do not infringe on the constitutional right to trial by jury. 188
Typical of these holdings is the rationale of the Alaska Supreme
Court, agreeing with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, that "a
damages cap [does] not intrude on the jury's fact-finding function,
because the cap [is] a 'policy decision' applied after the jury's de-
termination, and [does] not constitute a re-examination of the fac-
tice actions); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44.2825 (Repl. Vol. 2010) (damages cap for medical mal-
practice actions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2012) (cap on
medical malpractice damages, excluding punitive damages); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11
(Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2012) (damages cap for medical malpractice actions); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2012) (damages cap for medical malpractice ac-
tions). But see ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 31 (prohibiting damage caps in wrongful death or per-
sonal injury actions); KY. CONST. § 54 (prohibiting damage caps in wrongful death or per-
sonal injury actions); PENN. CONST. art. 3, § 18 (prohibiting damages cap in wrongful
death actions, or for injuries to persons or property); WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4 (prohibiting
damage caps in wrongful death or personal injury actions).
185. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 159-65 (Ala. 1991);
Smith v. Dep't. of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1095 (Fla. 1987); Knowles v. United States, 544
N.W.2d 183, 186-88 (S.D. 1996); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 723 (Wash.
1989).
186. Moore, 592 So.2d at 161 (quoting Indus. Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler,
547 So.2d 812, 819 n.1 (Ala. 1989)).
187. Smith, 507 So.2d at 1088-89.
188. See, e.g., Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1050-51 (Alaska 2002); Kirk-
land v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1119-20 (Idaho 2000) (upholding damages cap
because, even though fact-finding is in the exclusive province of the jury, the court must
apply the law, which is formulated by the legislature, to the facts found by the jury); Pe-
ters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 53-54 (Me. 1991) (noting that a "drastic" damages cap might vio-
late the right to a jury trial because it would effectively eliminate the remedy altogether);
English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (Mass. 1989); Adams v.
Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 906-07 (Mo. 1992); Wright v. Colleton Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 391 S.E.2d 564, 569-70 (S.C. 1990); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414
S.E.2d 877, 887-88 (W. Va. 1991).
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tual question of damages."189 No state supreme court has held
that, even when damages caps do encroach on fact finding by a
jury, they are constitutional. Rather, the courts holding damages
caps unconstitutional do so because they see capping damages as
infringing on a factual determination (the quantifying of damag-
es), 9' while courts holding damages caps constitutional see caps
as matters of substantive law. 9'
So having reviewed this body of jurisprudence on time limits
and judicial notice and damages caps, we return to the set of
questions posited at the beginning of this section in the hypothet-
ical "thought experiment" criminal trial: Would the judge violate
Article III and the Sixth Amendment if the judge entered an or-
der limiting the length of time each party had to present evi-
dence? Yes, if the consequence was judicially forced exclusion of
relevant evidence. Would the judge violate Article III and the
Sixth Amendment if the judge required, through the vehicle of
judicial notice, that the jury accept a fact as settled rather than
hear evidence and decide it for themselves? Yes, because of the
right of the jury to be the exclusive fact finder. Is there a textual
difference between the Sixth and Seventh Amendment that would
support a different answer for judicial notice in a civil case? No,
even though the legislative history and text of the pertinent Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence erroneously seems to assume so without
explanation. And in light of these answers, how do damages caps
not encroach on jury trial rights? Damages caps do violate jury
rights in jurisdictions where the caps delimit the factual quantifi-
cation of damages, as opposed to the substantive law classifica-
tion of the type of recoverable damage.
In summary, then, the jurisprudence is not explicit, but the ju-
risprudence is conceptually consistent and coherent-the import
of the jury's constitutionally protected role as fact finder is that
the jury is the exclusive fact finder. Put another way, procedural
or evidentiary rules that encroach on jury fact finding are facial-
ly, constitutionally suspect.
189. Evans, 56 P.3d at 1051 (citing Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1165 (3d Cir.
1989)).
190. See, e.g., Moore, 592 So.2d at 164.
191. See, e.g., Evans, 56 P.3d at 1051.
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V. FRE 403 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT OF THE
JURY'S ROLE AS EXCLUSIVE FACT FINDER
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, then Associate Justice
Rehnquist argued that the constitutionally enshrined roles of the
jury cannot be eliminated, absent constitutional amendment,
simply because they do not work very well:
It may be that if this Nation were to adopt a new Constitution today,
the Seventh Amendment guaranteeing the right of jury trial in civil
cases in federal courts would not be included among its provisions.
But any present sentiment to that effect cannot obscure or dilute our
obligation to enforce the Seventh Amendment, which was included in
the Bill of Rights in 1791 and which has not since been repealed in
the only manner provided by the Constitution for repeal of its provi-
sions.
The guarantees of the Seventh Amendment will prove burden-
some in some instances; the civil jury surely was a burden to the
English governors who, in its stead, substituted the vice-admiralty
court. But, as with other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the onerous
nature of the protection is no license for contracting the rights se-
cured by the Amendment. 192
While Justice Rehnquist was writing in dissent, the salient
point remains correct: If a constitutional provision is impaired by
a procedural or evidentiary rule, then applying the jurispruden-
tial hierarchy of the Supremacy Clause, 9 ' the procedural or evi-
dentiary rule falls unless it too is supported by a constitutional
provision.
It should not give pause that Justice Rehnquist wrote in dis-
sent. Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent in Parklane because he
disagreed with the majority's analysis that collateral estoppel did
not implicate jury rights;'94 the majority never asserted that if ju-
ry rights were triggered, those rights could be overcome by effi-
ciency or accuracy needs.'95
The Supreme Court has never recognized either efficiency or
accuracy as singular values of overriding constitutional im-
portance. Both in the context of jury trial rights and other rights,
192. 439 U.S. 322, 338, 346 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
193. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
194. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 347 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 346-48.
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the Court has rejected efficiency of trials and accuracy of verdicts
as a basis to limit the effect of constitutional clauses. Yet, effi-
ciency and accuracy are all that support the operation of FRE 403
excluding relevant evidence from the jury. Therefore, FRE 403 is
unconstitutional.
A. Neither Efficiency of Trials nor Accuracy of Verdicts Can
Justify Restriction of Constitutional Rights
The goals of efficiency of trials and accuracy of verdicts cannot
support keeping relevant evidence from the jury.
1. Efficiency of Trials Cannot Justify Restriction of
Constitutional Rights
In Blakely v. Washington,"' the Supreme Court explicitly held
that efficiency of trials could not support a restriction of Sixth
Amendment jury trial rights:
Our Constitution and the common-law traditions it entrenches, how-
ever, do not admit the contention that facts are better discovered by
judicial inquisition than by adversarial testing before a jury. Justice
Breyer may be convinced of the equity of the regime he favors, but
his views are not the ones we are bound to uphold.
Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree
trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice. One
can certainly argue that both these values would be better served by
leaving justice entirely in the hands of professionals; many nations of
the world, particularly those following civil-law traditions, take just
that course. There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the
Framers' paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of ad-
ministrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state
power accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and
jury."
197
In his dissent in Parklane, then Justice Rehnquist argued an
identical position in the context of the Seventh Amendment: "Just
as the principle of separation of powers was not incorporated by
the Framers into the Constitution in order to promote efficiency
or dispatch in the business of government, the right to a jury trial
was not guaranteed in order to facilitate prompt and accurate de-
196. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
197. Id. at 313 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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cision of lawsuits."9 ' And of course, for our purposes, there is no
doctrinal basis to distinguish between the Sixth Amendment
analysis in Blakely and a Seventh Amendment analysis-
efficiency either is a value of constitutional dignity or it is not.
Blakely is not an isolated opinion-in the context of a variety of
constitutional clauses, the Court repeatedly has held that effi-
ciency cannot trump constitutional rights. The Court has rejected
efficiency as a basis to ignore the constitutional requirement of
presidential oversight of the execution of the laws, holding, "the
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution," for "[cionvenience
and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-
of democratic government."'99 The Court has held that efficiency
could not justify bypassing the constitutional requirement of a
two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress, rather than just one,
to overcome a presidential veto."0 The Court has rejected efficien-
cy as a justification to violate the Constitution's command that
Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws.20' In his
dissent in United States v. Booker,"2 Justice Stevens (joined by
Justices Souter and Scalia) wrote that criminal sentencing guide-
lines infringed on Sixth Amendment jury rights: "We have always
trusted juries to sort through complex facts in various areas of
law. This may not be the most efficient system imaginable, but
the Constitution does not permit efficiency to be our primary con-
cern."
203
198. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S .... 130 S.
Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
200. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983).
201. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944).
202. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
203. Id. at 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The majority opinion did
not argue efficiency as a justification for an extra-constitutional remedy, nor did it argue
that efficiency was a constitutional value; rather, the majority argued that the Guidelines
did not implicate the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement. Id. at 256-58 (majority
opinion).
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2. Accuracy of Verdicts Cannot Justify Restriction of
Constitutional Rights
Accuracy fares no better than efficiency. There are two reasons
that the FRE 403 value of accuracy is not a constitutional value.
First, FRE 403 promotes the system's, or government's, interest
in some sort of objective accuracy in verdicts. But the Bill of
Rights defines limitations on the government and rights of the
individual, not vice versa. Second, the Court has held, through a
series of cases, that even a litigant does not have a constitutional
right to an accurate verdict.
While the Due Process Clause in some ways includes a notion
of verdict accuracy, the accuracy concept of FRE 403 is a very dif-
ferent value, and in ways that matter constitutionally. FRE 403
empowers a judge to keep relevant evidence from a jury if the
judge thinks the evidence may lead the jury to a verdict different
from what the judge perceives to be an objectively correct one."'
This is different from the due process right to a fair trial. "The
right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in es-
sence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations.""' In other words, the constitutional "fairness" right
is the right of an accused to a full and fair opportunity to present
a case to a jury.
The "accuracy" value FRE 403 codifies is different from fair-
ness, and from due process. FRE 403 is not about the opportunity
to include evidence, but rather, is about the power to exclude evi-
dence. Further, FRE 403 approaches evidence from the perspec-
tive of the court's perceptions of an accurate outcome, not the liti-
gant's perspective. Thus, FRE 403 allows the judge to impose on
the jury the judge's own view of what is the accurate trial out-
come and exclude evidence to promote that view, as opposed to
due process, which allows a litigant the opportunity to present to
the jury the litigant's views of what happened.
This is an important distinction constitutionally. If accuracy is
a constitutional value, it would be a value of the litigants, as op-
posed to a value of the government. Thus, for example, a criminal
defendant's right to present all exculpatory evidence is more ex-
204. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
205. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
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pansive than a prosecutor's right to present all incriminating evi-
dence." 6 So if accuracy is a constitutional value, then accuracy is
a basis for a litigant to insist upon the introduction and consider-
ation of all relevant evidence, not for the court's right to exclude
such evidence.
Further, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that even a
litigant has no constitutional right to an accurate verdict. The
lack of constitutional protection of accuracy is demonstrated by
Court opinions allowing the exclusion of litigant-proffered, admit-
tedly relevant-indeed sometimes key--evidence both post-
verdict and pre-verdict. A stark example of the post-verdict con-
text is the death penalty appeal decided in Herrera v. Collins.207
In Herrera, the Court ruled,
Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief ab-
sent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the under-
lying state criminal proceeding.
Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than
to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual
innocence.
The Constitution itself, of course, makes no mention of new tri-
als.
208
In other words, the criminal defendant's "right" to an objectively
accurate verdict in a death penalty conviction was insufficient to
overcome the system goal of finality. Plainly, even in this context,
accuracy in verdicts does not rise to the level of a singular consti-
tutional value.
Decisions on discovery sanctions-both in civil and criminal
cases-demonstrate the same point pre-verdict, where the system
concern is not finality but, rather, is regulating misbehavior.
Whether in a criminal case or a civil case, courts may exclude rel-
evant evidence-thereby impairing the likelihood of an accurate
verdict-as a punishment for pre-trial discovery abuse.
206. See Dripps, supra note 128, at 1390.
207. 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993).
208. Id. at 400-01, 408. Similarly, in Lockhart v. McCree, the Court held that assuming
'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-
death-qualified'juries," death-qualified juries still satisfied the Constitution. 476 U.S. 162,
173 (1986).
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In Taylor v. Illinois, the Court held that excluding a defense
witness's testimony as a sanction for failure to disclose the wit-
ness in response to a pretrial discovery request did not constitute
"constitutional error."219 In other words, even the right of a crimi-
nal accused to fully present evidence that the accused was not
guilty is an insufficient reason to limit a court's power to exclude
defense evidence in order to deter poor attorney behavior. Simi-
larly, in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, the Court held,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 (b) authorizes sanctions for fail-
ure to comply with discovery orders. The District Court may bar the
disobedient party from introducing certain evidence, or it may direct
that certain facts shall be "taken to be established for the purposes
of the action. . . ." The Rule also permits the trial court to strike
claims from the pleadings, and even to "dismiss the action. .. or
render a judgment by default against the disobedient party."
2 10
This conclusion-that whatever is the FRE 403 value of an ac-
curate verdict, it does not rise to the level of being a constitution-
al value that can vie with and perhaps override other constitu-
tional values-may seem surprising, but actually derives directly
from the context in which the Constitution was written. As Pro-
fessor George Thomas III explains,
The modem Court's instinct has been to seek ways to make it easier
for police and prosecutors to solve ... crimes .... But the Framers
were not concerned with the government's interest in solving crime.
While we today fear criminals, the Framers feared the central gov-
ernment....
The criminal procedure provisions that best advance the goal of
accurate verdicts are the Sixth Amendment rights to notice of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with adverse
witnesses, and to have compulsory process for obtaining favorable
witnesses. Yet the Framers said very little about these accuracy-
enhancing rights....
*.. No one claims now-indeed, no one claimed in the Magna Car-
ta, the Petition of Right in 1627, or the Massachusetts Body of Liber-
ties in 1641-that juries are uniquely qualified to deliver the truth
about factual guilt. 211
209. 484 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1988).
210. 447 U.S. 752, 763 (1980) (alterations in original).
211. Thomas, supra note 121, at 173, 175-76.
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3. Conclusion
The bottom line is straightforward: Efficiency qua efficiency is
not a constitutional value sufficient to compromise other constitu-
tional values. Accuracy qua accuracy is not a constitutional value
sufficient to compromise other constitutional values. And as the
Court held in Blakely, even fairness, which plainly does have a
constitutional role, does not support curtailment of jury trial
rights.
B. FRE 403 Empowers Courts to Restrict Jury Fact Finding in
Order to Promote Efficiency and Accuracy
The conclusion that FRE 403 is unconstitutional-now to be
explicitly set forth-should no longer be either surprising or du-
bious. If a constitutional provision and an extra-constitutional
system goal conflict, then the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion mandates a clear outcome-the extra-constitutional goal
must give way.212 If neither of the objectives of FRE 403-
efficiency and accuracy-are constitutional values, and if the jury
is constitutionally the exclusive fact finder, then FRE 403 consti-
tutionally cannot, in the interest of promoting accuracy or effi-
ciency, exclude from the jury relevant evidence on issues of con-
sequence.
This article is not the first to argue that there are constitution-
al problems with excluding evidence, but it is the first to assert
and assess those problems under the Constitution's jury trial
clauses. Professor Donald Dripps, quoted above, develops this
thesis in the context of the right to due process, arguing "A gen-
eration of Supreme Court cases ... holds that rules of evidence
that operate to exclude relevant, exculpatory evidence violate the
Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Pro-
cess and Confrontation Clauses."213 But by grounding his argu-
ment in doctrines other than the right to trial by jury, even if "the
exclusion of relevant but prejudicial exculpatory evidence [in a
212. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
213. Dripps, supra note 128, at 1391, 1402-04 & nn.54-63; see also John H. Blume,
Sheri L. Johnson & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance,
Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1099-
1103 (2007).
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criminal trial] is simply unconstitutional," 214 Professor Dripps
does not address the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
the exclusion of relevant evidence in all trials, criminal and civil,
and for all parties, including prosecutors and plaintiffs.215
Further, the Supreme Court has rejected the position that the
Due Process Clause, the Compulsory Process Clause, or the Con-
frontation Clause open the floodgates of evidence admissibility,
instead holding that "[t]he right to present relevant testimony is
not without limitation."216 But neither this holding, nor the hold-
ings of the precedent the Supreme Court quoted, considered the
implications of the Sixth or Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury. 27 Neither Blakely nor Parklane nor any other Supreme
Court case has squarely pitted evidentiary exclusionary rules
against either the Sixth or Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury. And this is not for want of opportunity.
In Holmes v. South Carolina, the issue was whether "a crimi-
nal defendant's federal constitutional rights are violated by an ev-
idence rule under which the defendant may not introduce proof of
third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic evi-
dence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict."
218
South Carolina had print, blood, DNA, and fiber evidence that
Bobby Lee Holmes had beaten, raped, and robbed Mary Stew-
art."19 Holmes presented expert testimony that the forensic evi-
dence all either had been planted or contaminated, but under
South Carolina evidence rules, Holmes was not allowed to call
"several witnesses" who placed Jimmy McCaw White near the
crime scene, coupled with four witnesses who testified either that
White had confessed or that White had acknowledged Holmes's
innocence." In other words, the trial court, as allowed by South
Carolina evidence rules, weighed the evidence on its own, came to
a conclusion on its own about factually who committed the crime,
214. Dripps, supra note 128, at 1391.
215. Professor Dripps recognizes, of course, that even in just criminal trials, and focus-
ing just on the accused, "[t]here is as yet ... no judicial recognition of a constitutionally
mandated system of free proof for the criminal defendant." Id.
216. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 55 (1987)).
217. Id. at 149-53; Rock, 483 U.S. at 53-56.
218. 547 U.S. 319, 321 (2006).
219. Id. at 321-22.
220. Id. at 322-24.
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and then shaped the evidence the jury heard to conform the ver-
dict to the trial court's factual conclusion.
The Supreme Court vacated this verdict, holding the South
Carolina exclusion rule was arbitrary, lacking a rational basis,
and thus violated a constitutional right inferred from the Due
Process Clause, the Confrontation Clause, and the Compulsory
Process Clause-a criminal defendant's right to present a mean-
ingful defense.2"' In the course of doing so, the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of FRE 403 in general, holding that the Consti-
tution permits judges "to exclude evidence that is repetitive...
only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment,
prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues."
But not in the opinion in Holmes, nor in any of the cases cited
and relied upon in Holmes, nor in any of the cases cited and relied
upon in the cases cited and relied upon in Holmes, did the Court
ever address the explicit constitutional right to trial by jury; ra-
ther, the sole constitutional issue the Court evaluated in each in-
stance was the inferred constitutional right of a defendant to de-
velop a defense.122 So while "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the constitutionality of evidence rules, like Rule
403," 24 the Court always has done so by looking only at constitu-
tional provisions other than jury trial rights.
That distinction is more than incidental. In Blakely, the under-
lying policies animating FRE 403-efficiency and accuracy-were
addressed and rejected by the Court in the context of jury trial
rights,2  and for good reason. The Constitution intentionally cre-
ates a system that gives priority to "jury trial over rationality."2 2 6
221. Id. at 324-25, 328-31. The Court recognized that in different circumstances such
an evidentiary exclusion could occur. Id. at 324. That confirms again that accuracy is not a
constitutional value.
222. Id. at 326-27 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986))(internal
quotation marks omitted).
223. See id. at 324-31; United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) ("[T]he proposition that the Due Process Clause guaran-
tees the right to introduce all relevant evidence is simply indefensible."); Rock v. Arkan-
sas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 58, 61 (1987); Crane, 476 U.S. at 683, 689-90; Delaware v. Van Ars-
dall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984);
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 302-03 (1973); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967).
224. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 170, § 403.1; see also Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at
42 (such rules are "familiar and unquestionably constitutional").
225. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
226. Dripps, supra note 128, at 1418.
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So the Court actually has, in all but name, already held that FRE
403 is unconstitutional.
One author has argued that FRE 403 can be justified as a tool
for protection of witnesses from abusive and unscrupulous coun-
sel.227 But as Herrera makes clear, the Constitution does not
guarantee a right to an accurate trial, or even a fair trial; rather,
the Constitution only guarantees an opportunity to a fair trial."2
And the only mention of witnesses in the Constitution is from the
perspective of the parties, not the witness-a party can compel
attendance of witnesses and can confront the opposing party's
witnesses.229 Neither of these rights takes into consideration the
witness's preferences.
In Galloway v. United States, the Court noted that
[t]he rules governing the admissibility of evidence, for example, have
a real impact on the jury's function as a trier of facts and the judge's
power to impinge on that function. Yet it would hardly be main-
tained that the broader rules of admissibility now prevalent offend
the Seventh Amendment because at the time of its adoption evidence
now admitted would have been excluded.
230
And, of course, history teaches that this must be so. First, at most
the Seventh Amendment assumed the right to exclude from the
jury hearsay evidence-which has its own idiosyncratic issue of
confrontation rights-as opposed to generically excluding any
time consuming or otherwise nettlesome evidence.2'31 More fun-
damentally, as discussed above, the Sixth and Seventh Amend-
ments anticipated that in jury trials, the jury would hear all rele-
vant evidence, leaving it to the jury, not the judge, to make of it
what it would.2
There is an important distinction here. The jury constitutional-
ly has the right to hear all relevant evidence, not all evidence.
The definition of relevance does not encompass any marginally
227. See Dolan, supra note 50, at 229.
228. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993).
229. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
230. 319 U.S. 372, 391 n.22 (1943).
231. See Dripps, supra note 128, at 1397-98 & nn.33-34.
232. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Colleen P. Murphy, Deter-
mining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74
TEX. L. REV. 345, 378 n.145 (1995) (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec., 356 U.S. 525,
537 (1958)); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The
Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1118 (2003).
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helpful fact to any issue of marginal materiality; rather, the fact
has to bear on an issue of consequence.233 It is, however, unques-
tioned relevant and material evidence on issues of consequence
that FRE 403 nonetheless allows to be excluded23 4 and which con-
stitutionally cannot be excluded.23
C. Accounting for Galloway and the Historical Test in Civil Trials
In doing any constitutional analysis of a possible impairment of
the right to trial by jury, one other issue must be dealt with, at
least in the context of civil trials. Among the textual differences
between the constitutional guarantees of criminal juries and the
constitutional guarantee of civil juries is that Article III and the
Sixth Amendment guarantee a right to trial by jury in "all" crim-
inal trials, while the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to
trial by jury in civil trials of "suits at common law." '236 The Su-
preme Court has interpreted the "suits at common law" language
of the Seventh Amendment under the so-called "historical test,"
holding that not all civil cases have a jury trial right; rather, the
way to determine whether a contemporary case carries a jury
right is to postulate hypothetically that a contemporary federal
civil case, filed in federal district court under current-day laws,
instead had been filed in England in 1790s, and to ask whether it
then would have been filed in the common law courts or in the
233. See FED. R. EVID. 401(b).
234. This is the answer to Professor Dripps hypothetical about evidence that a man-
slaughter victim was a serial rapist. Dripps, supra note 128, at 1417-18.
235. Professor Dripps concludes that "the law of evidence does not trust juries to ra-
tionally evaluate some forms of exculpatory evidence." Dripps, supra note 128, at 1413.
While that is an accuracy concern, plainly a similar sentiment can be said about efficien-
cy-the law of evidence does not trust advocates to make good choices about case presen-
tation either. Judges also are highly critical of lawyers in this regard. See, e.g., Clemens
Judge Demands Trial Speed Up to Stem Jury Frustration, HOUSTON CHRON. (May 8,
2012), http: //blog.chron.com/clemens/2012/05/clemens-judge-demands-trial-speed-up-to-
stem-jurys-frustration/. Those concerns may be well-taken, but the Constitution makes a
different choice.
236. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. For a discussion of the possible interpretations of "suits
at common law," see generally Klein, supra note 37. It also bears noting that the Supreme
Court holds that "all" in Article III and the Sixth Amendment is only a reference to "seri-
ous" crimes. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 158 (1968). For a detailed explication of this textual interpretation, see Felix
Franfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaran-
ty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926). While this limitation on interpreting "all"
may implicitly animate a notion of efficiency, that does not change the thesis of this arti-
cle, as that would not juxtapose limiting the extant jury trial right to serve efficiency, but
rather redefines the scope of the jury trial right.
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equity courts.237 The Court sometimes has applied the same test
to determine whether various civil trial reforms are permissible
under the Seventh Amendment. 23' Thus, an analysis of the consti-
tutionality of FRE 403 in civil jury trials could require an analy-
sis of whether eighteenth century England had an evidentiary
counterpart allowing exclusion of relevant evidence from jury
consideration.
The constitutional analysis "could" require an historical analy-
sis, rather than "does" require it, because of one of the holdings in
Galloway v. United States.239 Galloway was a World War I veteran
who decades later sought benefits for what today might be called
PTSD. 4 ° At trial, after Galloway rested, the trial court granted a
motion for directed verdict.24 ' On review, the Supreme Court
evaluated under the Seventh Amendment the constitutionality of
directed verdicts.242 The Court began this analysis with an appar-
ent holding that "[t]he [Seventh] Amendment did not bind the
federal courts to ... the specific rules of evidence then prevailing
[in eighteenth Century England]. " "' While this line from the
opinion neither was a holding nor was supported by the cases the
Court cited,244 if it is taken at face value then no historical analy-
sis is required of FRE 403. But because this line from Galloway is
actually dicta and is unsupported, at least a cursory historical
analysis is appropriate as part of a complete constitutional evalu-
ation of FRE 403.245
237. See Klein, supra note 37, at 1020-30.
238. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-84 (1996)
(applying the historical test to determine whether construction of patent claims must be
decided by a jury).
239. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
240. Id. at 372-74.
241. Id. at 373.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 390; see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 491 (1935) (Stone, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he Seventh Amendment guarantees that suitors in actions at law shall have the
benefits of trial of issues of fact by a jury, but it does not prescribe any particular proce-
dure by which these benefits shall be obtained, or forbid any which does not curtail the
function of the jury to decide questions of fact as it did before the adoption of the Amend-
ment. It does not restrict the court's control of the jury's verdict, as it had previously been
exercised, and it does not confine the trial judge, in determining what issues are for the
jury and what for the court, to the particular forms of trial practice in vogue in 1791.").
244. See Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on to
Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 276-83 (2009).
245. The Court seemed to return to something akin to the historical test in Montana v.
Egelhoff, stating that
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At first blush, analysis of FRE 403 under the historical test
might seem particularly tricky. After all, while specifically 403-
like exclusionary rules were not even conceptualized until the
nineteenth century, the 1790s were, as best can be determined,
precisely the moment when generally the most ubiquitous of evi-
dentiary exclusionary rules-hearsay-began to coalesce.24  So
hearsay arguably is at least a rough historical analog for FRE
403, albeit an imperfect one.
But there is scant, if any, reason to believe that any other basis
for exclusion of evidence existed in the 1790s in England. A series
of English cases contemporaneous with the ideas captured in the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments shows the respective roles of
judge and jury-in each the judge disagreed with the verdict, be-
lieving the evidence could not support it; and in each, the solution
was a new trial, rather than entry of judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.247 These cases not only reflected "the ever-shifting line
that divided the responsibilities of judge and jury" but also re-
flected that, even in cases involving no jury question of fact, the
solution was "to give the case to the jury with strong instructions"
rather than enter a non-suit or directed verdict."24
As these cases suggest, "judges had a lively relationship with
juries. Judges would question jurors, argue with them, and even
send them back to reconsider their verdict."249 But in the end, the
preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States
than it is of the Federal Government, and... we should not lightly construe
the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the in-
dividual States. Among other things, it is normally within the power of the
State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out,.., and its
decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process
Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 (1996); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)
("[Tihe Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned
review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules . . . ."). There can be little debate, however,
that the Framers considered jury rights to be fundamental.
246. See Gallanis, supra note 43, at 500-03, 530-31, 533-37.
247. See 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF
ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 158-60 (1992).
248. Id. at 160.
249. Rende B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge.Jury Relations in Ear-
ly Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 522-23 (1996); see also John
H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View From the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 119 (1983). It does bear noting, at least in passing, that the
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only time a judge could keep facts from the jury was when the
parties agreed to all of the facts and the conclusions deriving from
them; all disputed facts, no matter how improbable, went to the
jury to decide.25 °
So, while the historical test is a different analytical approach,
the endpoint is the same: FRE 403 is unconstitutional.
VI. WHY THIS MATTERS
The potential implications of FRE 403 being unconstitutional
are both micro and macro in scale. The proponents of FRE 403 es-
sentially argue that in the particular context of trial manage-
ment, FRE 403 is the thin doctrinal line between efficiently
reached just verdicts and chaos. Thus, if FRE 403 is unconstitu-
tional, this could put the functionality of the entire system at
risk. And that's the micro implication.
The macro implication is that efficiency, accuracy, and similar
apparently extra-constitutional rationales pervade jurisprudence
as a justification for substantive, procedural, and evidentiary doc-
trines that themselves implicate constitutional rights. If these ra-
tionales are not constitutional values, then large swaths of our
jurisprudence may be unconstitutional.
A. The Micro Problem
FRE 403 is described as the "cornerstone.' of the Federal Rules
of Evidence."' Court opinions reflect that FRE 403 is seen as the
best tool to respond to unethical or neurotic attorneys.252 The per-
ception is that trials will be of unwieldy length and obtuseness
without the judge stepping in to regulate matters, and FRE 403 is
the vehicle to do so.
An initial response to this concern is that it "ain't necessarily
so." There is no particular reason to think that any attorney, oth-
er than perhaps one trying their first case, will believe putting in
unlimited and confusing evidence is a strategy likely to be re-
historical test concerns itself with civil trials, and this quotation is a description of crimi-
nal trial practice.
250. See Thomas, supra note 23, at 143.
251. Gold, supra note 70, at 497 (citations omitted).
252. Id. at 508.
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warded.25 In fact, lawyers routinely self-edit the presentation of
evidence. And juries often disregard evidence.254 But perhaps even
more to the point, the Federal Rules of Evidence were only adopt-
ed in 1975. The first two hundred years of trials in America were
not notably more unruly, long, or unjust than the next thirty-five
years under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Also, the premise of much of FRE 403-that certain evidence is
beyond the ability of the jury to handle-is dubious. At the time
of the promulgation of FRE 403, academics simply assumed that
jurors could not be accurate and dispassionate decision makers.255
But later scholars question the skepticism toward the capabilities
of juries.256 And empirical evidence seems to support the later
scholars.
For example, the quintessential 403 exclusion is evidence of
prior crimes in order to protect the defendant from improper con-
viction of a similar offense.257 This is called improper "propensity
evidence." Courts consistently have voiced concern with so-called
propensity evidence.25 In a decision pre-dating the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed that prior crimes evi-
dence could not be used to prove propensity: "The inquiry is not
253. For example, there is already a roughly analogous strategic choice for criminal
lawyers right now-if no one plea-bargained, then the entire system would grind to a halt
and no one would get convicted. Attorneys do not make this choice, and while it in part
certainly is explained by the "prisoner's dilemma" nature of the decisional matrix, it could
be explained, at least in part, by the likely consequences that would be borne by the attor-
ney's own clients.
254. Indeed, nothing would prevent the jury itself from having a more robust and pro-
active tool to regulate evidence See, e.g., Stephan Landsman & James F. Holderman, The
Evolution of the Jury Trial in America, 37 LITIG. 32, 36-37 (2010) (discussing the move-
ment of allowing or even encouraging juror questions). There is no systemic reason why a
jury could not itself proactively indicate that it found unnecessarily cumulative further
evidence on an issue, or that it wished an explanation of the relevance of seemingly con-
fusing evidence. Likewise, there is no reason to think judges are particularly gifted ama-
teur psychologists, able to accurately predict how juries will react, or overreact, to types of
evidence.
255. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 50, at 227 ("Given the makeup of our juries, it is legit-
imate to conclude that jurors can be prejudiced by evidence.").
256. See Crump, supra note 2, at 625-28.
257. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (1997).
258. The exclusion of similar acts or crimes is an evidence principle that post-dates the
Constitution and the Sixth and Seventh Amendments both in England and in the United
States and evolved without reference to the constitutional protection of trial by jury. See
generally Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 988, 989 (1938).
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rejected because [the evidence] is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is
said to weigh too much with the jury .... 259
In an iconic post-rules evidence opinion-Old Chief v. United
States-Johnny Lynn Old Chief was charged with assault with a
deadly weapon, using a firearm in a crime of violence, and being a
felon in possession of a firearm.26 ° An element of the felon in pos-
session charge was, of course, that he in fact had a prior felony
conviction.261 He did-for assault causing serious bodily injury.262
The defense offered to stipulate that he had a prior felony convic-
tion, thus keeping from the jury the knowledge of precisely what
the prior conviction was for.263 The government declined the of-
fered stipulation, and the trial judge allowed the government to
inform the jury that the prior conviction was for assault." On re-
view, the Court held that the nature of the prior felony was rele-
vant, as defined by FRE 401, to the felon in possession charge,
even if stipulated to, but that the particulars should be excluded
under FRE 403.265 In other words, the Court held that while the
nature of the particular prior felony was relevant, the Court also
held that the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing the
government to decline the proffered defense stipulation; rather,
under FRE 403 the trial judge was required to exclude the admit-
tedly-relevant evidence because of a concern that the jury could
not be trusted to weight it correctly in evaluating guilt.
2 66
Yet, when studied empirically, it turns out that the premise of
both of these holdings-that juries will not properly understand
or weigh this evidence-is wrong. Professors Ronald Allen and
Larry Laudan did empirical work because "[iun the majority of le-
gal systems in the developed world, triers-of-fact are routinely
made aware of the prior convictions of the accused."2 61 Yet, all of
the hypotheses underlying the contrary position in FRE 403 "are
empirically testable ... have already been tested and most stand
259. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
260. 519 U.S. at 174.
261. Id. at 174-75.
262. Id. at 175.
263. Id. at 175-76.
264. Id. at 177.
265. Id. at 186-92.
266. Id. at 191-92.
267. Larry Laudan & Ronald Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence
and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 494
(2011).
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refuted or, at least, rendered highly implausible." 268 Their work
revisited the extant empirical work and found "existing policies
on the admissibility of prior crimes evidence are deeply flawed,
because either they are built upon a set of erroneous a priori as-
sumptions about juror inferences or they ignore critical aspects of
police and prosecutorial behavior."69 The paper analyzed both da-
ta from thirty years of mock jury studies and forty years of actual
jury trial studies. 27' As Professors Allen and Laudan concluded,
"[W]e now have solid empirical evidence-instead of intuitions-
that the current system is both intellectually dishonest and that
it does little or nothing to aid those defendants whom it was spe-
cifically invented to protect." 71
Similarly, to some extent, excluding evidence in pursuit of "ac-
curacy" implicitly assumes that jurors, stripped of distracting ev-
idence, can and will decide cases logically; empirical evidence be-
lies this implicit assumption.2 72 Only time will tell whether
empirical evidence will expose that the other assumptions under-
lying FRE 403 are similarly flawed. But those assumptions may
be more articles of faith than of evidence.
The bottom line for purposes of this article, however, is even if
FRE 403 is, from a system perspective, the "right" choice, it is not
a choice constitutionally permissible in civil or criminal jury tri-
als. The Framers were aware of the risk of interminable trials-
such trials described the chancery courts of the day, which, ironi-
cally, were not jury trials. In the 1940s, one argument raised for
the later rejected Model Rule 303 was that, in its absence, trials
would be like those in late eighteenth century England, where
trials were long and rambling because of no restrictions on admit-
ting relevant evidence:
If any and all evidence may be admissible which-in terms of some
commonly accepted generalization about human conduct or natural
events-would operate to any extent to alter the apparent probabil-
ity of some material proposition, the field of judicial inquiry in most
cases would be almost unlimited. Trials could come to an end only by
the exhaustion of lawyers' ingenuity or clients' money, and the trial
judge or jury might be overwhelmed and bewildered by the multiplic-
268. Id. at 496.
269. Id. at 500.
270. Id. at 500, 503.
271. Id. at 527.
272. See generally Blume, Johnson & Paavola, supra note 213, at 1090-91 & n. 142.
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ity of collateral issues. Such a rule would result in the apparent jus-
tice and the practical injustice characteristic of English Chancery
273
practice a century and a half ago.
Plainly, efficiency was not a hallmark of jurisprudence at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution.
The Framers were aware of the possibility of confusing or mis-
leading juries. The letters and writings in the ratification debates
discuss this issue repeatedly.274 With open eyes, the Framers of
the Constitution made no mention of these concerns. Rather, they
chose the right to trial by jury. That choice cannot be ignored.275
B. The Macro Problem
If FRE 403 falls, what also may fall for the same or similar rea-
sons? Or put another way, what other rules within the litigation
rulebook promote system goals such as efficiency at the expense
of jury fact finding? This is a more comprehensive and thoughtful
survey than space permits here. But consider just a few exam-
ples. FRE 404 to 406, 412 to 415,276 and 608 to 609, each address-
es the admissibility of seemingly relevant aspects of a witness's
past, and excludes that evidence using a 403-like balance, some-
times with explicit cross-reference to FRE 403. '77 FRE 407 to 411,
273. George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 701
(1941) (emphasis added).
274. See supra Section III.
275. Arguably, if FRE 403 is unconstitutional, then tinkering with it to make it better
will not work. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 2, at 651-53.
276. Federal Rules of Evidence 412 through 415 codify the "rape shield" doctrine and
related special evidence rules for sexual offenses. See FED. R. EvID. 412; FED. R. EVID. 413;
FED. R. EVID. 414; FED. R. EVID. 415. The rape shield law, in particular, might be thought
of as FRE 403 on steroids. While the constitutionality of rape shield laws has consistently
been confirmed, rarely has the challenge been on the grounds of jury trial rights, and the
few courts that have considered the statutes as a possible infringement of the right to trial
by jury have upheld the statutes on the basis that irrelevant or immaterial evidence is be-
ing excluded. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexual License:
Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 152-61 (2002).
See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of "Rape Shield" Statute Re-
stricting Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R. 4th 283 (1980). In other
words, no court has addressed whether relevant and material evidence of a rape victim's
sexual past may be excluded from the jury. Further, FRE 412(b)(1)(C) provides that in
criminal cases, evidence otherwise excluded under the Rape Shield Law should be admit-
ted if "exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights." FED. R. EVID.
412(b)(1)(C). This would seem, in the criminal context, to either intentionally or uninten-
tionally solve the possible constitutional problem.
277. The threshold question of relevance remains a legal determination for a judge, and
so is unaffected by the argument in this article, which addresses only whether a judge can
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610, and much of privilege law, take relevant evidence and ex-
clude it for public policy reasons external to the trial.278 The en-
tirety of article VII of the Rules of Evidence, regulating opinion
testimony, is delimiting potentially relevant evidence based on
403-like weighing by the judge. 9 The evidence exclusion sanc-
tions permitted under FRCP 11, 26, and 37, as well as the inher-
ent power of the court to impose evidence exclusion sanctions for
contempt and for spoliation, are premised on system goals out-
weighing jury fact-finding."' Arguably, FRCP 8, 50, and 56 in-
volve a judge weighing or re-weighing evidence in lieu of leaving
matters exclusively to jury verdict. '81 Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 supports, in the criminal context, potential exclu-
sion of evidence as a discovery sanction.282 Criminal evidence ex-
clusion sanctions, such as "fruit of the poisonous tree," may merit
revisiting under a jury trial right analysis. Motion in limine prac-
tice in civil cases may violate the Constitution. And in a variety of
Supreme Court cases, including the ones discussed earlier in this
article, the Court asserts "practicality" and efficiency as system
necessities justifying delimiting otherwise robust constitutional
rights.
This will be the subject of what I anticipate to be my next arti-
cle-what exactly would the system look like if we took jury trial
rights seriously? What evidence exclusion doctrines have, or do
not have, grounding in a constitutional principle? If all exclusion
rules that lack constitutional grounding were removed from the
system, would that be palatable, or would it require some sort of
adjustment? And if so, what adjustment would the Constitution
allow?
But for the moment, this much can be said. FRE 403, by de-
sign, is the cornerstone of the Federal Rules of Evidence. And
FRE 403 is unconstitutional.
exclude evidence already determined to be relevant. FED. R. EVID. 104.
278. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of the Costs and
Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 251-57 (2005) (describing
various policy reasons for excluding relevant evidence).
279. See FED. R. EVID. art. VII. Because hearsay is grounded in the constitutional right
to confront one's accuser, at least in criminal trials it would be subject to an entirely dif-
ferent analysis.
280. FED. R. CIv. P. 11; FED. R. Civ. P. 26; FED. R. CIv. P. 37.
281. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 50; FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
282. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article develops two ideas. First, that it is at least plausi-
ble, and perhaps compelling, that FRE 403 violates the constitu-
tional guarantees of a right to trial by jury. Second, that the pos-
sible constitutional infirmity of FRE 403 has never been
discussed in case law, scholarly publication, or code development.
Frankly, both ideas are startling.
FRE 403 truly is the cornerstone of modern trial practice. But
the system should not ignore the Constitution when it does not
suit system needs. Until amended, we simply have an inefficient
Constitution.

